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REAL ESTATE AND LAND USE LAW
John V. Cogbill, III*
D. Brennen Keene **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article provides a survey of the significant property law
case decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Virginia during
the period beginning June 1, 2001 and ending June 1, 2002. The
cases covered involve, inter alia, condemnation litigation, contract
disputes, the doctrine of equitable subrogation, easement dis-
putes and land use litigation. In addition, this article will discuss
the significant changes made to the Virginia Code during the
2002 Virginia General Assembly Session that will be of interest to
the Virginia property law practitioner.1 The significant legislative
changes that are discussed in this article include enactment of
the Business Trust Act, amendments related to condemnation
proceedings, enactment of a requirement that property owners'
associations maintain a capital reserve account, amendments to
CRESPA, amendments regarding the recordation of certificates of
satisfaction, and enactment of cluster housing enabling legisla-
tion for local zoning ordinances.
* Partner, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia. B.S., 1970, United States Mili-
tary Academy at West Point; J.D., 1979, University of Richmond School of Law.
** Associate, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia. B.S., 1991, Guilford College;
J.D., 1996, University of Richmond School of Law.
The authors would like to thank Robert H. Tyler, Associate, McGuireWoods LLP, for
his invaluable research assistance on this article.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all changes to the Virginia Code became effective as of
July 1, 2002.
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1I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Condemnation
1. Damage to the Residue
In City of Virginia Beach v. Oakes,2 the City of Virginia Beach
initiated condemnation proceedings to acquire the fee interest in
a portion of the landowners' property fronting along Oceana
Boulevard.3 The taking deprived the landowners of 195 feet of
road frontage, leaving the landowners with 148 feet of road front-
age.4 The city also sought a permanent drainage easement for the
installation of a detention pond to collect storm water runoff from
3,400 linear feet of Oceana Boulevard (a four-lane highway).' The
city intended to use the detention pond to filter pollutants that
would be contained in the roadway runoff, including such pollut-
ants as lead, mercury, oil, and grease.6 The landowners and the
city agreed that the value of the condemned land was $60,000,
"which included the fee simple value of the land used for a drain-
age easement even though the city only acquired an easement on
that land."7
The landowners contended, however, that the taking damaged
the value of the remainder of the property and that the landown-
ers were entitled to receive additional compensation.' The trial
court heard expert testimony from an environmental scientist
who testified that the landowners would incur increased costs for
monitoring the land to detect whether pollutants in the detention
pond had infiltrated other portions of the landowners' property.9
A land-planning expert also testified that the location and size of
the detention pond prevented the landowners from constructing
14,000 square feet of office/warehouse space on the remainder of
the property.1 ° The land planner testified that, even though the
2. 263 Va. 510, 561 S.E.2d 726 (2002).
3. Id. at 512, 561 S.E.2d at 726.
4. Id. at 512-13, 561 S.E.2d at 726.
5. Id. at 513, 561 S.E.2d at 726-27.
6. Id. at 513, 561 S.E.2d at 727.
7. Id. at 512, 561 S.E.2d at 726.
8. See id. at 513-15, 561 S.E.2d at 727-28.
9. Id. at 513, 561 S.E.2d at 727.
10. Id. at 514, 561 S.E.2d at 727.
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zoning designation for the property did not currently permit the
office/warehouse use, such use was the highest and best use of
the portion of the property near the detention pond." Building on
the testimony of the environmental scientist and the land plan-
ner, a real estate appraiser stated that, given the impacts of the
taking on the remainder of the property, the damage to the resi-
due amounted to $120,000.12
The city argued that the landowners' claim of damages to the
residue was based upon hypothetical development plans and were
too remote and speculative. 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia
agreed with the city.14 The court stated that "'[i]n ascertaining
such damages, both present and future circumstances which ac-
tually affect the value of the property at the time of the taking
may be considered, but remote and speculative damages may not
be allowed.""' 5 The court concluded that the landowners' potential
office building was a "product of pure speculation" because the
building could be built only if the city rezoned the property and
approved a sewage treatment system for the property. 6 The court
further stated that the evidence of possible contamination was
speculative, 7 and cited its previous decisions, which held that the
"eminent domain provisions in the Virginia Constitution have no
application to tortious or unlawful conduct, whether by contrac-
tors engaged in constructing public improvements, governmental
agents, or third parties who are strangers to condemnation pro-
ceedings.""
11. Id.
12. Id. at 514, 561 S.E.2d at 728. The real estate appraiser testified that the damage
estimate "was based upon $65,000, which included contingencies and 'monitoring costs'
associated with the detention pond and $55,000 in lost rents" from the loss of size in the
potential office building that could be constructed on the property. Id at 515, 561 S.E.2d at
728.
13. Id. at 515, 561 S.E.2d at 728.
14. Id. at 516, 561 S.E.2d at 728.
15. Id. at 516, 561 S.E.2d at 728-29 (quoting E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Riner, 239
Va. 94, 100, 387 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1990)).
16. Id. at 517, 561 S.E.2d at 729.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting State Highway & Transp. Comm'r v. Lanier Farm, Inc., 233 Va. 506,
510-11, 357 S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1987)) (citations omitted).
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2. Lessee's Role in Condemnation Proceedings
The Supreme Court of Virginia dealt with the lessee's role in a
condemnation proceeding in Lamar Corp. v. Commonwealth
Transportation Commissioner.19 In Lamar, the Commonwealth
Transportation Commissioner recorded a certificate condemning
a portion of land owned by L. F. Loree, III and Norwood H. Davis,
Jr. as co-trustees under the Goodwin Children's Trust Agreement
(the "landowners").2" The Lamar Corporation ("Lamar") leased a
portion of the property subject to the certificate for the installa-
tion and maintenance of a billboard.21
After the Commonwealth filed a petition to appoint commis-
sioners to set the value of the land taken, Lamar filed a petition
to intervene in the valuation proceedings.22 Lamar filed its peti-
tion on the basis that it was an owner of the billboard and, as a
tenant of the land, subject to the certificate of take.23 The Com-
monwealth moved the trial court to dismiss Lamar's petition to
intervene or "to restrict Lamar's participation in the valuation
proceeding to that of a 'tenant' to the extent authorized by [Vir-
ginia] Code § 25-46.21:1. "124 The circuit court granted Lamar's pe-
19. 262 Va. 375, 552 S.E.2d 61 (2001).
20. Id. at 378, 552 S.E.2d at 62. The condemned property is located near the intersec-
tion of Route 250 and Three Chopt Road in Henrico County. Id. The Commonwealth de-
sired to use the property for the widening of Route 250. Id.
21. Id. Lamar is a company engaged in the business of leasing billboard space for ad-
vertising purposes. Id. Lamar leased the property under a lease agreement first executed
in August 1992, providing for an initial term of five years with the lease continuing on a
year-to-year basis thereafter "unless either party... give[s] the other party written notice
of nonrenewal at least 60 days prior to the expiration of the then-current term." Id. The
lease vested ownership in the billboard in Lamar, and the lease further provided that "[i]n
the event of condemnation of the subject premises[,] ... [a]ny condemnation award for
[Lamar's] property shall accrue to [Lamar]." Id. at 378-79, 552 S.E.2d at 62 (alterations in
original).
22. Id. at 379, 552 S.E.2d at 62.
23. Id.
24. Id. Virginia Code section 25-46.21:1, as it was in effect at the time this litigation
was commenced, provided as follows:
Any tenant under a lease with a term of twelve months or longer may par-
ticipate in the proceedings described in § 25-46.21 to the same extent as his
landlord or the owner .... Nothing in this section shall be construed, how-
ever, as authorizing such tenant to offer any evidence in the proceedings de-
scribed in § 25-46.21 concerning the value of his leasehold interest in the
property involved therein or as authorizing the commissioners or juror, as
applicable, to make any such determination in formulating their report.
VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.21:1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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tition to intervene but limited Lamar's participation in the valua-
tion proceedings to the extent authorized by Virginia Code section
25-46.21:1.5 The circuit court also granted the Landowners' mo-
tion to preclude Lamar from nominating commissioners.26
During the valuation proceedings, the Commonwealth filed mo-
tions in limine to exclude various portions of Lamar's experts' tes-
timony.27 The circuit court granted both motions in limine, which
specifically excluded the testimony of Donald T. Sutte ("Sutte"),28
who was to testify that "just compensation in this case consist[ed]
of two elements: (1) the fair market value of the land taken plus
damages, if any, to the residue; and (2) the fair market value of
the billboard.'29 After the presentation of experts, the commis-
sioners awarded $115,000 for the value of the land taken (includ-
ing construction easements) and $35,000. for damage to the resi-
due of the property.3 ° In the allocation proceedings, Lamar
presented evidence that the fair market value of the billboard
structure plus the value of the leasehold (including the billboard
site) was $60,600 based on a sales comparison method of valua-
tion and $63,000 based on an income method of valuation.3' The
landowners presented testimony that the rental value of the bill-
board site (approximately 500 square feet) was $794 per year.32
The landowners' expert assigned no value to the billboard struc-
ture.3 The circuit court held that Lamar's interest in the overall
award was $6,462, including the value of the property taken
(based upon the commissioners' award) plus two months of gross
income.34
On appeal, Lamar argued that the circuit court erred because it
failed to qualify Lamar as an "owner," thus denying Lamar the
right to participate in the valuation proceedings as an owner
25. Lamar, 262 Va. at 379, 552 S.E.2d at 62.
26. Id. at 379, 552 S.E.2d at 63.
27. Id. at 380, 552 S.E.2d at 63.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 379-80, 552 S.E.2d at 63. The Commonwealth also sought to exclude testi-
mony of a real estate appraiser appearing on behalf of Lamar who would have testified
that the fair market value of the billboard was $60,600. Id. at 380, 552 S.E.2d at 63.
30. Id. at 381, 552 S.E.2d at 64.
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rather than as a "tenant."35 The Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
agreed with Lamar, stating that the court has consistently held
that a lessee of condemned property must be treated as a "tenant"
in the condemnation proceedings even if the lessee has affixed a
structure to the land.36 The court did, however, agree with Lamar
that the circuit court improperly excluded much of Lamar's pro-
posed testimony during the valuation proceedings.37 The court
held that the billboard constituted a "structure" under Virginia
Code section 25-252(b), and that the fair market value of that
structure must be included in the total award of just compensa-
tion-even when a lessee has the ability to remove the structure
under the terms of its lease.38
The court disagreed with the Commonwealth's contention that
Sutte's methods of valuation (the sales comparison and income
methods) were inappropriate and therefore inadmissible.39 The
court held that Sutte's evaluation of the billboard's value under
the income method considered income as a component of the in-
trinsic value of the billboard structure, stating that "his consid-
eration of the income generated by the sign was not a violation of
the general rule barring a landowner from presenting evidence of
expected income from the operation of a business conducted on
the condemned property." ° Finally, the court agreed with Lamar
that the testimony presented by the Commonwealth's expert was
inadmissible because his appraisal determined the value of the
lease to the landowners, "rather than the value of the billboard
affixed to the land as if it belonged to the landowner."4'
35. Id.; see infra Part III.G.3 (listing legislative changes to the definition of"owner" in
condemnation proceedings).
36. Lamar, 262 Va. at 382-83, 552 S.E.2d at 64. The General Assembly amended the
Virginia Code during the 2002 session to include billboard owners within the definition of
"owner" in a condemnation proceeding against property subject to a billboard owner's lease
brought by the Virginia Department of Transportation. See infra Part III.G.3.
37. Lamar, 262 Va. at 384, 552 S.E.2d at 65.
38. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 25-252(b) (Repl. Vol. 2000). The court stated that "Code §
25-252(a) provides that a condemnor who acquires real property also acquires 'an equal
interest in all buildings, structures, or other improvements located upon the real prop-
erty.'" Lamar, 262 Va. at 384, 552 S.E.2d at 65; see VA. CODE ANN. § 25-252(a) (Repl. Vol.
2000).
39. Lamar, 262 Va. at 385, 552 S.E.2d at 66.
40. Id. (citing Ryan v. Davis, 201 Va. 79, 82, 109 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1959); Anderson v.
Chesapeake Ferry Co., 186 Va. 481, 495-96, 43 S.E.2d 10, 18 (1947)).
41. Id. at 386-87, 552 S.E.2d at 67.
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B. The Sanctity of Sepulchre
Virginia has long recognized that the descendants of a buried
person are the beneficiaries of a property right in the nature of an
easement in the final resting place of that buried person. A
court in equity may permit the disinterment of a body for reloca-
tion to a new resting place,43 but the court should allow a disin-
terment only on a showing of good cause.44 In Grisso v. Nolen,45
the Supreme Court of Virginia was faced with the question of
whether a decedent's ex-husband had standing to seek disinter-
ment of his ex-wife for reburial in a grave plot that the ex-
husband had purchased while cohabitating with his ex-wife.46 The
court in Grisso determined that any property interest that the ex-
husband may have had in his ex-wife's final resting place was
severed upon divorce. 7 Thus, he did not have standing to seek
disinterment of his ex-wife's remains for re-interment in the bur-
ial plot he purchased prior to her death.4
C. Contracts
During the period covered by this survey article, the Supreme
Court of Virginia decided several cases that dealt with real estate
contracts. The cases involve questions of whether a contract was
formed, the enforceability of a right of first refusal, the interpre-
tation of an "attorney's fees" provision, a damages claim for
breach of contract, and a claim for tortious interference with con-
tract.
42. See, e.g., Goldman v. Mollen, 168 Va. 345, 354-55, 191 S.E.2d 627, 631 (1937).
43. Grisso v. Nolen, 262 Va. 688, 695, 554 S.E.2d 91, 95 (2001) (citing Grinnan v.
Fredericksburg Lodge, 118 Va. 588, 592, 88 S.E. 79, 80 (1916)).
44. Id. at 695, 554 S.E.2d at 95 (citing Goldman, 168 Va. at 356, 191 S.E.2d at 631).
45. 262 Va. 688, 554 S.E.2d at 91 (2001). For further discussion of this case see also J.
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 37 U. RICH.
L. REV. 357, 376 (2002).
46. Id. at 690, 554 S.E.2d at 92.
47. Id. at 695, 554 S.E.2d at 95.
48. Id. at 695-96, 554 S.E.2d at 95-96 (stating that "[t]o the extent that the authority
to determine the disposition of a decedent's remains is a quasi-property right of the surviv-
ing spouse, that right would not survive the entry of a divorce decree") (citation omitted).
20021
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
1. Contract Formation
In G & M Homes II, Inc. v. Pearson,49 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the signature of one of two joint sellers in a
contract for the sale of undivided interests in land is not sufficient
to consummate the agreement, even in regard to the interest held
by the individual signor.5" The property subject to this contract
dispute had been owned by one of the sellers, Mrs. Pearson, and
her late husband as tenants in common. 1 Prior to execution of
the contract Mr. Pearson died, and his last will and testament
provided that all his real estate would pass to Mrs. Pearson. 2 Af-
ter Mrs. Pearson signed the contract with G & M Homes II, Inc.,
she disclaimed the property in dispute in this case, and Mr. Pear-
son's interest in the property passed to the Pearsons' daughter,
Herta Ann Pearson Gould." The contract named both Mrs. Pear-
son and Ms. Gould as sellers.54
In support of its holding, the Supreme Court of Virginia
pointed out that the contract: (1) had signature blanks for both
sellers; (2) referred to both Mrs. Pearson and Ms. Gould collec-
tively as the "Seller"; (3) anticipated a fee simple interest in the
Seller; and (4) never contemplated the transfer of a divided inter-
est.55 As such, the court determined that the contract "was never
consummated."5"
2. Right of First Refusal
In Firebaugh v. Whitehead,57 Martha F. Sowers conveyed ap-
proximately 13.77 acres of land to Charles and Martha White-
head on July 22, 1987.58 Shortly thereafter, the parties executed a
right of first refusal for the Whiteheads to purchase additional
49. 263 Va. 107, 556 S.E.2d 743 (2002).
50. Id. at 109, 556 S.E.2d at 744.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 109-10, 556 S.E.2d at 744.
54. Id. at 110, 556 S.E.2d at 745.
55. Id. at 112-15, 556 S.E.2d at 746-48.
56. Id. at 115, 556 S.E.2d at 747.
57. 263 Va. 398, 559 S.E.2d 611 (2002). For further discussion of this case, see John-
son, supra note 45, at 382.
58. Id. at 400, 559 S.E.2d at 613.
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acreage adjacent to the 13.77 acres.59 The right of first refusal
was recorded in the Botetourt County Clerk's Office.6" The
Whiteheads later moved to Mississippi and did not notify Sowers
that they were leaving the area.6 ' Sowers later died in 1993, and
William C. Firebaugh and Evelyn 0. Carlson were qualified as co-
executors of the Sowers' estate.6 2 The co-executors received an of-
fer from the Botetourt County Club to purchase land in the
Sowers' estate, including the property subject to the Whiteheads'
right of first refusal.6 3 On May 21, 1993, the co-executors con-
veyed the land to the country club.64 The Whiteheads were noti-
fied of the sale in March 1994, and subsequently brought suit
against the co-executors and the country club.65 The trial court
awarded the Whiteheads damages in the amount of $64,000 plus
prejudgment interest from November 5, 1997, and post-judgment
interest until the award was paid.66 The Whiteheads and the co-
executors appealed, and the Supreme Court of Virginia granted
the co-executors' appeal and denied the Whiteheads' appeal. 7
The supreme court upheld the validity of the right of first re-
fusal to buy real property, despite the lack of some significant
terms.6 ' The court also denied the claims of the seller's co-
executors that the right was personal in nature and, thus, was
not binding on the co-executors.6 9 The court held that a right of
first refusal need not include information about notification, or
provisions about how and when the holder must exercise the
right.70 The agreement did not run afoul of the rule against per-
petuities because the right was found to be personal to the hold-
ers and therefore would have terminated upon their deaths (the
"lives in being"). 71 The court restated its position from Smith v.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 400-01, 559 S.E.2d at 613.




65. Id. The Whiteheads requested specific performance or, in the alternative, mone-
tary damages from the co-executors. Id. at 401, 559 S.E.2d at 614.
66. Id. at 402, 559 S.E.2d at 614.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 404, 559 S.E.2d at 615.
69. Id. at 405, 559 S.E.2d at 616.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 404-05, 559 S.E.2d at 615-16.
2002]
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Bailey,72 stating that the description of the property need only be
sufficient "to afford the means, with the aid of extrinsic evidence,
of ascertaining with accuracy what is conveyed and where it is." 73
The court explained that executors are "held to be liable on all
contracts of the testator which are broken in his lifetime, and,
with the exception of contracts in which personal skill or taste is
required, on all contracts broken after his death."74 Granting an
interest in land, it held, does not require such skill or taste and
the death of the grantor does not discharge the obligation.75
3. Attorney's Fees Provision in a Nonsuit Context
The parties in Sheets v. Castle6 executed a contract for the
purchase and sale of land, in which the "prevailing party" to any
dispute arising out of the contract was entitled to compensation
for its attorney's fees. 77 After filing suit against the seller for spe-
cific performance, the buyer moved for a nonsuit. 7' The seller then
filed a petition for attorney's fees claiming to be the "prevailing
party."79
In his petition, the seller argued that the Supreme Court of
Virginia had already decided whether a defendant in a nonsuit is
a "prevailing party" when it denied appeal of a circuit court case
that had stated the rule as such."° Specifically, the seller argued
that because petitions for appeal are resolved on the merits, deny-
ing the appeal bestowed binding precedential application of the
circuit court opinion throughout the Commonwealth. l The Su-
preme Court of Virginia disagreed that a denial of review bestows
72. 141 Va. 757, 127 S.E. 89 (1925).
73. Firebaugh, 263 Va. at 403, 559 S.E.2d at 615 (quoting Smith, 141 Va. at 768, 127
S.E. at 93 (citing Merritt v. Bunting, 107 Va. 174, 179, 57 S.E. 567, 568 (1907))).
74. Id. at 405, 559 S.E.2d at 616 (quoting Looney v. Belcher, 169 Va. 160, 170-71, 192
S.E. 891, 895 (1937)).
75. Id.
76. 263 Va. 407, 559 S.E.2d 616 (2002).
77. Id. at 409, 559 S.E.2d at 617-18.
78. Id. at 409-10, 559 S.E.2d at 618.
79. Id. at 410, 559 S.E.2d at 618.
80. Id. at 410-11, 559 S.E.2d at 618.
81. Id. at 411, 559 S.E.2d at 618-19.
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precedential value and held that there is no "prevailing party"
when a nonsuit is awarded.
4. Damages for Breach of Contract
Countryside Corp. v. Taylor 3 dealt with an expert's calculation
of damages for a breach of contract for real property. 4 Country-
side had contracted to construct a road on its property in such a
way as to provide access to an adjacent tract of land that Taylor
intended to subdivide and develop. 5 When the road was con-
structed, Countryside left a strip of its own land between the road
and the Taylor property, significantly reducing access to the road
from the Taylor tract.8 6
When Taylor first filed suit in 1997, Countryside deeded the
strip of land to Taylor.17 However, the strip contained various
structures that inhibited access to the road and was encumbered
by a drainage easement in favor of Henrico County.8 Taylor later
filed suit against Countryside alleging that the placement of the
road had reduced the marketability of his property. 9
At trial Taylor called an expert real estate appraiser who used
a "project value analysis" to calculate the difference between the
value of the project with the road in place, as well as the value
with the road where it was contracted to be constructed. 90 How-
ever, the real estate appraiser failed to take into consideration
the conveyance of the strip of land to Taylor in his real estate ap-
praisal.91 The jury awarded $200,000 to Taylor, which Country-
side appealed, asserting that the appraiser's testimony "was
speculative as a matter of law because it was based upon an erro-
neous factual foundation."92 Stating that conveyance of the strip
of land to Taylor was a critical fact in determining damages be-
82. Id. at 414, 559 S.E.2d at 620.
83. 263 Va. 549, 561 S.E.2d 680 (2002).
84. Id. at 550, 561 S.E.2d at 680.
85. Id. at 550-51, 561 S.E.2d at 680.
86. Id. at 551, 561 S.E.2d at 680-81.
87. Id. at 551, 561 S.E.2d at 681.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 551-52, 561 S.E.2d at 681.
91. Id. at 552, 561 S.E.2d at 681.
92. Id. at 552-53, 561 S.E.2d at 682.
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cause it provided access to the Taylor tract, the Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed and reversed the trial court, entering judgment
for Countryside. 93
5. Tortious Interference with Contract
In Rappahannock Pistol & Rifle Club, Inc. v. Bennett,94 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court
of Lancaster County that set aside a jury's compensatory award
of $125,000 for tortious interference with contract.95 With knowl-
edge of the Rappahannock Pistol & Rifle Club's ("Club") valid con-
tract to sell a parcel of land, the Bennetts had negotiated and
closed a contract to buy the land for a higher price.96 The court
stated that placing a backup contract for a higher price 'does not,
in and of itself, constitute tortious interference.' 97 Despite the
Club's attempt to demonstrate that the Bennetts had motivated
the local community to stop the Club's transaction-and, in fact,
had caused the County's Board of Supervisors to amend the
County's zoning ordinance in a manner that favored the Club's
use of another site-the court decided that, as a matter of law,
the Club did not produce evidence linking the backup contract
with the seller's refusal to close on the Club's contract.98 The
court stated that the link could not be inferred from the evidence
provided and noted that "it is only what the Bennetts did, and not
what their neighbors or others may have done on their own, that
is relevant to the question whether the Bennetts are liable to the
Club."99
D. Doctrine of Equitable Subrogation
In Centreville Car Care, Inc. v. North American Mortgage
Co.,'°° the Supreme Court of Virginia decided whether the doc-
93. Id. at 553-54, 561 S.E.2d at 682.
94. 262 Va. 5, 546 S.E.2d 440 (2001).
95. Id. at 7, 17, 546 S.E.2d at 440, 446.
96. See id. at 8-10, 546 S.E.2d at 441-42.
97. Id. at 16, 546 S.E.2d at 445 (quoting the trial court's letter opinion).
98. Id. at 13-14, 546 S.E.2d at 444.
99. Id. at 14, 546 S.E.2d at 444.
100. 263 Va. 339, 559 S.E.2d 870 (2002).
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trine of equitable subrogation should be applied to a purchase
money deed of trust recorded in favor of North American Mort-
gage Company ("North American").'' In the Centreville case,
Margaret Lynch ("Lynch") purchased a residential property for
$210,000 on September 2, 1996.02 Lynch obtained loan financing
for $199,500 of the purchase price from Financial Mortgage, Inc.,
who recorded a deed of trust evidencing the loan note.0 3 On Octo-
ber 7, 1996, Lynch and her husband, Abed E. Higassi ("Higassi"),
borrowed $150,000 from B&T Car Care, Inc. (Centreville's prede-
cessor in interest), which was evidenced by a promissory note and
a second deed of trust on the residential property.14
On March 10, 2000, Lynch conveyed the property to Moham-
med Bouzghaia and Corrina Y. Bouzghaia ("Bouzghaias") for a
purchase price of $210,000.°5 The Bouzghaias financed the pur-
chase price with a promissory note in the amount of $208,250
that was secured with a first deed of trust on the property in fa-
vor of North American. 06 Prior to closing, the settlement agent
caused a title search to be conducted on the property; however,
the title examiner failed to discover the existence of Centreville's
second deed of trust.0 7 Thus, when the settlement agent caused
the recordation of the deed of trust in favor of North American,
that deed of trust was inferior in priority to the deed of trust in
favor of Centreville. °'0  The settlement agent disbursed
$198,928.07 of the Bouzghaia loan proceeds to pay off Lynch's
first deed of trust and then disbursed $3,953.93 to Lynch.'0 9 The
beneficiary under the first deed of trust recorded a certificate of
satisfaction for the first deed of trust on April 28, 2000.110 Subse-
quently, Centreville notified the trustee under Lynch's second
deed of trust that Lynch and Higassi were in default on their
101. Id. at 342, 559 S.E.2d at 870-71.
102. Id. at 342, 559 S.E.2d at 871.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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payments, and "the trustee advertised a trustee's sale of the
property for August 29, 2000.""'
On August 23, 2000, North American and the trustee under the
North American deed of trust filed a bill of complaint against
Centreville and the trustee under the Centreville deed of trust
seeking equitable subrogation."12 The chancellor agreed with
North American and granted subrogation.113 The chancellor based
this decision on the fact that Centreville's predecessor in interest
knew that its note was essentially unsecured when its second
deed of trust was recorded and that Centreville would not be
prejudiced by the subrogation."4 Centreville appealed." 5
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the chancellor's final
decree. '16 In reaching this decision, the court stated that the doc-
trine of equitable subrogation requires a fact-specific inquiry into
the circumstances of the particular case, and that "'no general
rule can be laid down which will afford a test in all cases for its
application.""' 7 The court did say, however, that there are several
principles that assist in the analysis of an equitable subrogation
claim: "[f]irst, the subrogation is not appropriate where interven-
ing equities are prejudiced. Second, ordinary negligence of the
subrogee does not bar the application of subrogation where '[a]n
examination of the facts ... shows that the equities strongly fa-
vor' the subrogee."118 Considering the facts of this case, the court
determined that Centreville had a right to anticipate that Lynch
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 344, 559 S.E.2d at 872.
114. Id. The chancellor did not subrogate the entire amount of North American Mort-
gage's deed of trust. Id. The chancellor awarded North American a first lien of
$198,928.07, with Centreville's entire lien being given second priority. Id. The balance of
North American's lien ($9,321.93) was third in priority. Id. It appears from the case that
the chancellor believed that, at the time Lynch obtained the second lien from Centreville
Car Care's predecessor in interest, the difference in the original purchase price and the
amount of Lynch's first deed of trust was an amount that Centreville's predecessor in in-
terest could have expected to receive if it had to sell the property by trustee's sale and sat-
isfy the first deed of trust. See id.
115. Id. at 345, 559 S.E.2d at 872. The circuit court also stated that Centreville would
be unjustly enriched by allowing it the position of first lien. Id. at 344, 559 S.E.2d at 872.
116. Id. at 348, 559 S.E.2d at 874.
117. Id. at 345, 559 S.E.2d at 872 (quoting Fed. Land Bank v. Joynes, 179 Va. 394, 402,
18 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1942)).
118. Id. (quoting Fed. Land Bank, 179 Va. at 404-05, 18 S.E.2d at 921) (alterations in
original).
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and Higassi would satisfy the liens against the property. 119 Cen-
treville also had a reasonable expectation that, when the Lynch
first deed of trust was satisfied, Centreville's deed of trust would
move into a position of first priority. 2 ° The court determined that
it would be inequitable to grant North American equitable relief
when North American's negligence created the circumstance, par-




a. Defense of Mistaken Belief of an Express Easement
In Nelson v. Davis,2 ' the Nelsons accessed their property by
use of a gravel driveway that crossed over property owned by
Davis. 23 The Nelsons acquired their property by a deed which
referenced a plat that showed the gravel driveway crossing the
Davis property.'24 The plat referenced in the deed conveying the
Davis property also included a description of the gravel drive-
119. Id. at 346, 559 S.E.2d at 873.
120. Id. at 346-47, 559 S.E.2d at 873.
121. Id. at 347, 559 S.E.2d at 873-74. The court's rationale is as follows:
The realities are that under those circumstances Centreville would be preju-
diced because there would be no incentive for Lynch and Higassi to pay their
debt to Centreville in order to protect any equitable ownership in the prop-
erty. In addition, there would be little, if any, reason to anticipate that the
Bouzghaias would pay the debt secured by North American Mortgage's lien
on their property because the property would remain encumbered by Centre-
ville's lien. Under this circumstance, the primary realities are that upon the
chancellor's granting of subrogation, North American Mortgage and the
Bouzghaias would logically effect a "friendly foreclosure" to eliminate Centre-
ville's lien and leave Centreville with little or no recovery under the foreclo-
sure sale. Equity will not condone the creation of such a circumstance, espe-
cially when that circumstance flows directly from the negligence of the party
seeking the benefit of it to the prejudice of an innocent party. Similarly, our
commitment to a 'liberal application of the principle of subrogation" is not of-
fended by that reasoning.
Id. at 347-48, 559 S.E.2d at 874 (citations omitted).
122. 262 Va. 230, 546 S.E.2d 712 (2001).
123. Id. at 232, 546 S.E.2d at 713-14.
124. Id.
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way. 12 At trial, the Nelsons presented witnesses who testified
that the Nelsons and prior owners of the Nelson property had
used the gravel driveway to access the Nelson property for more
than twenty years, thus establishing a presumption that the Nel-
sons had a prescriptive right to use the gravel driveway.126
Davis rebutted this argument with evidence that no prior
easement had been granted to benefit the Nelson property;
rather, a review of the chain of title for the Nelson property
showed that an access easement that benefited the Nelson prop-
erty actually crossed another parcel of land. 127 Thus, Davis
claimed that the Nelsons could not prove that use of the gravel
driveway was adverse to Davis because their assertion was based
on the mistaken belief that a recorded right existed.'28 The trial
court ruled in favor of Davis, declaring that the Nelsons failed to
prove that they were the beneficiaries of an express easement or
an easement by prescription. 129
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's ruling
and found in favor of the Nelsons." ° First, the court stated that
the record in the Nelson case contained no evidence that "anyone
using the gravel road in question did so under a mistaken belief
that there was an express easement."3 ' The court also deter-
mined that the Nelsons had established by clear and convincing
evidence that their use of the gravel road across the Davis prop-
erty had been "open, visible, continuous, exclusive and unmo-
lested" for at least twenty years.'32 Further, the court determined
125. Id. at 232, 546 S.E.2d at 713.
126. Id. at 233-34, 546 S.E.2d at 714.
127. Id. at 234, 546 S.E.2d at 714-15. The gravel driveway ran along the boundary of
the Davis property, and the recorded easement was just across that boundary on an adja-
cent property. Id.
128. See id. at 234-35, 546 S.E.2d at 715. The trial court, relying on the case of Chaney
v. Haynes, 250 Va. 155, 458 S.E.2d 451 (1995), agreed with Davis that the Nelson's had
failed to prove that their use of the gravel driveway was adverse to Davis. Nelson, 262 Va.
at 234-35, 546 S.E. 2d at 715. The Supreme Court of Virginia in Chaney held that "lu]se of
property, under the mistaken belief of a recorded right, cannot be adverse as long as such
mistake continues." Chaney, 250 Va. at 159, 458 S.E.2d at 453 (citations omitted).
129. Nelson, 262 Va. at 234, 546 S.E.2d at 715.
130. Id. at 237, 546 S.E.2d at 716.
131. Id. at 236, 546 S.E.2d at 715-16.
132. Id. at 236-37, 546 S.E.2d at 716.
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that Davis had offered no direct evidence to rebut the claim of ad-
verse use of the gravel road.
133
b. Failure to Rebut the Presumption of an Easement by
Prescription
In Martin v. Moore,3 the Moores filed a bill of complaint seek-
ing to enjoin the Martins from interfering with the Moores' use of
an entrance road and driveway that crossed a portion of the Mar-
tins' property.'35 The joint driveway served both the Moores'
property and the Martins' property and had been in continuous
use since the late 1960s. 136 The Martins responded that use of the
driveway had been permissive and therefore the Moores could not
claim an easement by prescription.'37 The trial court determined
that the Moores had proven by clear and convincing evidence that
the basic elements of an easement by prescription existed. 3 ' In
addition, the trial court determined that the Martins failed to
produce evidence to rebut the Moores' prima facie showing of a
prescriptive easement.'39 Thus, the trial court determined that
the Moores had an easement by prescription over the joint drive-
way. 1
40
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's ruling
on this point, holding that the Martins had failed to rebut the
presumption of a prescriptive easement.14 ' The court stated that
"[c]ircumstantial evidence may not be used to establish a permis-
sive use in cases involving joint driveways. 'There must be a posi-
133. Id. at 237, 546 S.E.2d at 716.
134. 263 Va. 640, 561 S.E.2d 672 (2002). The Martin case also involved questions re-
garding trespass and nuisance, which are discussed in infra Part II.I.2.
135. Martin, 263 Va. at 643, 561 S.E.2d at 674.
136. See id. at 644, 561 S.E.2d at 675.
137. Id. at 643, 561 S.E.2d at 674.
138. Id. at 646, 561 S.E.2d at 676.
139. Id. at 647, 561 S.E.2d at 676.
140. Id. at 644, 561 S.E.2d at 675. The trial court also determined that the Moores had
an easement by implication. Id. at 647 n.*, 561 S.E.2d at 677 n.*. The Martins sold the
property owned by the Moores to the prior owners of the Moore property, and the driveway
was in existence at the time of that conveyance. See id. at 645, 561 S.E.2d. at 675. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia did not address this part of the trial court's finding because the
issue became moot when the Moores proved that they had an easement by prescription. Id.
at 647 n.*, 561 S.E.2d at 677 n.*.
141. Id. at 647, 561 S.E.2d at 677.
20021
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tive showing that an agreement existed."'" The only evidence
that the Martins could establish was that they had discussed
maintenance of thd road with Mr. Bryant, the prior owner of the
Martin property. 14 3 Mr. Martin and Mr. Bryant both testified that
Martin gave Bryant "permission" to use the joint driveway.144 The
court did not find this fact to be dispositive, stating that
the chancellor, as trier of fact, properly could conclude from all the
evidence that what the parties meant was that both knew that a por-
tion of the driveway and entrance was on the Martins' side of the
property line, and that the [Martins] never prevented the Bryants
from using the road. [In his testimony, Mr.] Bryant agreed that what
he meant by "getting permission" was that Martin "didn't object" to
the use. 145
2. Parole Evidence.for Interpretation of an Express Easement
In Pyramid Development, L.L. C. v. D&J Associates,146 D&J As-
sociates ("D&J") sought a judicial decree that the language of a
deed that conveyed a rail siding easement was ambiguous and
thus could be used by D&J for vehicular ingress and egress to
property.'47 When the easement was first created, a main rail line
was located in the vicinity of the D&J property, and a rail spur
track branched off the main line and ran behind a group of build-
ings-including a building on the D&J property. 48 Rail service
along the main rail line was discontinued in the 1970s.149 In 1998,
Pyramid purchased the property over which the rail siding ease-
ment crossed. 5 '
142. Id. at 646, 561 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting Causey v. Lanigan, 208 Va. 587, 593, 159
S.E.2d 655, 660 (1968)).
143. See id. at 647, 561 S.E.2d at 676. The Martins owned their property for less than
twenty years; however, the prior owner of the Martin property also used the joint drive-
way and the Martins were able to tack the time of the previous use to their ownership pe-
riod to meet the twenty-year requirement. Id. at 646, 561 S.E.2d at 676.
144. Id. at 647, 561 S.E.2d at 676.
145. Id. at 647, 561 S.E.2d at 676-77.
146. 262 Va. 750, 553 S.E.2d 725 (2001).
147. Id. at 753, 553 S.E.2d at 727.
148. Id. at 752, 553 S.E.2d at 726.
149. Id. at 752, 553 S.E.2d at 727.
150. Id. at 753, 553 S.E.2d at 727. After purchasing its property in 1998, Pyramid
sought to improve that property by paving it and adding parking spaces. Id. Pyramid ap-
proached the owners of the properties that had been beneficiaries of the rail siding ease-
ment about contributing financially to defray the costs of providing the paved drive aisles
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The parties agreed that if the easement was not extinguished
when the rail service ceased, then the easement continued to en-
cumber the property owned by Pyramid. 5' The pertinent granting
language in the easement is as follows:
[Tihe right, privilege and easement to use in common the said spur
tracks and sidings, and so much of the property of Davis Brothers,
Incorporated, in the block bounded by Patton Avenue, the Boulevard,
Altamont Avenue, Norfolk Street, and Summit Avenue, and abutting
said spur tracks and sidings as may be necessary to afford the prop-
erty hereby conveyed and the improvements thereon free and con-
venient access to and use of the said spur tracks and sidings .... 152
The trial court determined that this language was ambiguous
and permitted D&J to introduce parol evidence to determine
whether the scope of the easement included use of motor vehi-
cles.1" 3 D&J introduced evidence that it regularly used the Pyra-
mid property for "loading and unloading trucks and other vehi-
cles."'54 The trial court found in favor of D&J, stating that the
easement rights afforded to D&J included the "'use of the way to
access [its] building in a reasonable manner in the ordinary
course of [its] business."'155 The trial court also stated that "'the
more modern use of motor vehicles to access plaintiffs building
instead of the spur tracks [did] not violate the terms of the ease-
ment at issue. ''156
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the easement lan-
and parking areas. Id. In exchange, Pyramid would grant the property owner/contributors
use of the parking areas. Id. Pyramid planned to rent the spaces to owners who did not
enter into the agreement. Id. Needless to say, D&J Associates did not enter into the agree-
ment. See id.
151. Id. at 752, 553 S.E.2d at 727.
152. Id. at 752, 553 S.E.2d at 726-27.
153. Id. at 753, 553 S.E.2d at 727.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting the trial court opinion) (alterations in original).
156. Id. (quoting the trial court opinion) (alterations in original). In making this deter-
mination, the trial court relied on the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion in Wagoner v.
Jack's Creek Coal Corp., 199 Va. 741, 744-45, 101 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1958). In Pyramid De-
velopment, the supreme court determined that the easement in Wagoner was distinguish-
able from the easement in question in Pyramid Development. 262 Va. at 755, 553 S.E.2d at
728. Specifically, the court stated that the easement of the "wagon haul road" in Wagoner
was not limited as to use, and the road continued in existence after wagons were no longer
used for transportation. Id. On the other hand, the easement in Pyramid Development "is
specifically limited to allowing access to the spur tracks and sidings. The spur tracks and
sidings are no longer in use; therefore, the limited purpose of the easement is no longer in
existence." Id.
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guage was not ambiguous and that the trial court improperly
admitted parol evidence.157 The court stated that the easement
was "expressly limited to allowing access to the spur tracks and
sidings, and nothing more."'58 The court also determined that
"[wihen the rail service was discontinued, the purpose of the
easement, which was to allow access to the spur tracks and sid-
ings, ceased to exist" and thus the easement itself was extin-
guished. 159
F. Home Warranty
In Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 6 ° a case that was overturned by legis-
lative action,'6 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
"whether under Code § 55-70.1, a purchaser of a new home is re-
quired to notify the builder of a defect in construction within the
statutory warranty period before bringing an action against the
builder for breach of that warranty."'62 The purchasers of a new
157. Pyramid Dev., L.L.C., 262 Va. at 753, 553 S.E.2d at 727.
158. Id. The court also distinguished this case from Strickland v. Barnes, 209 Va. 438,
164 S.E.2d 768 (1968), a case in which the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that a
plat that showed a twenty-five foot strip "reserved for future R.R. Siding" was ambiguous.
Pyramid Dev., L.L.C., 262 Va. at 754, 553 S.E.2d at 728. The court explained that the
easement in Strickland was referenced on a plat for a railroad siding that had not been
constructed, "so the Court was called upon to decide whether any right had been granted
in the 25-foot strip pending the construction of the siding." Id. at 754-55, 553 S.E.2d at
728. Thus, the deed in Strickland was ambiguous because it did not make clear what the
intended use of the easement was prior to construction of the rail siding. Id. at 755, 553
S.E.2d at 728. The court stated that
in the present case, however, the deed unambiguously granted an easement
"to use in common the said spur tracks and sidings, and so much of the prop-
erty.., abutting said spur tracks and sidings as may be necessary to afford
the property hereby conveyed.., free and convenient access to and use of the
said spur tracks and sidings.
Id.
159. Id. at 756, 553 S.E.2d at 728-29.
160. 262 Va. 673, 554 S.E.2d 88 (2001).
161. See infra notes 384-87 and accompanying text.
162. Vaughn, 262 Va. at 675, 554 S.E.2d at 89. Virginia Code section 55-70.1, as it was
written at the time of this case decision, provided, in pertinent part:
B. In addition, in every contract for the sale of a new dwelling, the vendor, if
he is in the business of building or selling such dwellings, shall be held to
warrant to the vendee that, at the time of transfer of record title or the
vendee's taking possession, whichever occurs first, the dwelling together with
all its fixtures is sufficiently (i) free from structural defects, so as to pass
without objection in the trade, (ii) constructed in a workmanlike manner, so
as to pass without objection in the trade, and (iii) fit for habitation.
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home, the Becks, discovered within one year of owning their new
home that their water well produced such an inadequate flow of
water that they could not "perform routine household functions,
such as washing dishes, washing clothes, and bathing."'63 To
remedy the problem, the Becks hired a company to dig and install
a second well at their own cost.16 ' At first the Becks believed that
the problem with the original well was caused by a faulty water
pump, an item for which the Becks thought Vaughn, Inc.
("Vaughn") would not have been responsible. 16' The Becks later
determined that Vaughn was responsible for correcting the defect
with the well, but they did not notify Vaughn of the defect until
they filed suit against him.166 Vaughn denied the breach of war-
ranty claim and asserted an affirmative defense that the Becks
failed to notify Vaughn of the defect within the one-year statutory
warranty period.
1 67
The Supreme Court of Virginia, affirming the trial court, de-
termined that Virginia Code section 55-70.1 "plainly does not re-
quire the purchaser of a new dwelling to give notice of a defect in
construction to the builder within the one-year statutory war-
ranty period as a prerequisite for bringing a breach of warranty
D. If there is a breach of warranty under this section, the vendee, or his heirs
or personal representatives in case of his death, shall have a cause of action
against his vendor for damages.
E. The warranty shall extend for a period of one year from the date of trans-
fer of record title or the vendee's taking possession, whichever occurs first,
except that the warranty pursuant to subdivision (i) of subsection B for the
foundation of new dwellings shall extend for a period of five years from the
date of transfer of record title or the vendee's taking possession, whichever
occurs first. Any action for its breach shall be brought within two years after
the breach thereof. As used in this section, the term "new dwelling" shall
mean a dwelling or house which has not previously been occupied for a period
of more than sixty days by anyone other than the vendor or the vendee or
which has not been occupied by the original vendor or subsequent vendor for
a cumulative period of more than twelve months excluding dwellings con-
structed solely for lease. The term "new dwelling" shall not include a condo-
minium or condominium unit created pursuant to Chapter 4.2 (§ 55-79.39 to -
79.103) of this title.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).




167. Id. at 676, 554 S.E.2d at 89.
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action under the statute based on that defect."16 The court stated
that Virginia Code section 55-70.1 required two things to happen
in order to bring a breach of warranty action: (1) a breach of war-
ranty within one year from the date that record title is trans-
ferred to the purchaser or the date the purchaser takes posses-
sion, whichever occurs first; and (2) filing of the breach of
warranty action within two years after the breach occurs. 6 9 The
court stated that to find that the code section in question required
notice "would require [the court] to add new language to the stat-
ute." 70 The General Assembly resolved this issue for the court by
amending section 55-70.1 to require such notice. 171
G. Lease Interpretation
Pocahontas Mining Limited Liability Co. v. Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp.172 involved the interpretation of a provision in a mining
lease. 73 Pocahontas Mining ("Pocahontas") leased land to Jewell
Ridge Coal Corporation ("Jewell Ridge") for the purpose of mining
and processing coal for sale. 174 The lease was originally executed
in 1941 (the "1941 lease"), and the parties amended and extended
the 1941 lease in 1969 (the "1969 Amendment"), so that the lease
would expire on October 31, 2001 unless terminated sooner pur-
suant to the terms of the lease. 71 Jewell Ridge maintained a coal
preparation plant on the property subject to the lease, but discon-
tinued the plant's operation in 1979 because it became "obsolete
and uneconomical to operate."176 Thereafter, the plant fell into
disrepair and parts of the plant were vandalized or stolen.'77
168. Id. at 678, 554 S.E.2d at 90-91.
169. Id. at 678, 554 S.E.2d at 91.
170. Id.
171. For discussion of this legislative change, see infra Part III.E.
172. 263 Va. 169, 556 S.E.2d 769 (2002).
173. Id. at 171, 556 S.E.2d at 769. This case arose as a result of both parties appealing
the decision of the Buchanan County Circuit Court. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia
granted both appeals and consolidated the cases for purposes of the appeal. Id.
174. Id. at 172, 556 S.E.2d at 771.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 171-72, 556 S.E.2d at 771. The preparation plant operated by Jewell Ridge
was capable of processing coal from only one coal seam known as the Raven seam. Id. at
172, 556 S.E.2d at 771. At the time of the preparation plants closure, almost all of the Ra-
ven seam coal in the vicinity of the preparation plant had been mined. Id.
177. Id.
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The 1969 Amendment included a provision that required
Jewell Ridge to leave "'the [coal] preparation plant with all fixed
machinery and fixed equipment necessary for its operation"' on
the premises upon termination of the lease.178 Pocahontas sought
declaratory judgment in the Buchanan County Circuit Court re-
questing interpretation of the lease provision.179 The trial court
ruled that
Jewell Ridge was obligated to restore 'to functional capabilities and
operational standards' all fixed machinery and fixed equipment at
the preparation plant "at a level consistent with health, safety, and
environmental laws, rules and regulations ... in effect on the last
date [Jewell Ridge] commercially operated the preparation plant."
180
On appeal, Jewell Ridge argued "that the lease provision only
precluded it from removing the preparation plant and certain of
its fixed equipment from the premises. . . .""' Pocahontas argued
that the plain meaning of the language required Jewell Ridge to
leave 'an operational plant complete with equipment necessary
for its operation" and that the trial court erred in determining
that Jewell Ridge was not obligated to upgrade the plant to cur-
rent health, safety and environmental laws and regulations.8 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed and modified the cir-
cuit court's decision.8 3 First, the court determined that the lease
provision was unambiguous.18 1 The court then looked at the lease
178. Id. (quoting the lease). The entire lease provision read as follows:
Upon final termination of this lease, whether on October 31, 2001, prior ex-
haustion of mineable and merchantable coal, or upon termination of any ex-
tensions which Lessee may have made as above provided, the premises shall
revert to Lessor and there shall remain intact upon the premises the prepa-
ration plant with all fixed machinery and fixed equipment necessary for its
operation including, without limitation, all outside tracks, power lines, con-
veyor belts and equipment, and tipples, but not including any moveable
equipment above-ground or below-ground and not including any under-
ground power lines, substations, conveyor belts or other movable under-
ground equipment and machinery.
Id. at 171, 556 S.E.2d at 770.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 172, 556 S.E.2d at 771 (quoting the trial court opinion) (alterations in origi-
nal). The trial court also ruled "that the lease provision did not require the preparation
plant and its fixed equipment to be 'upgraded to current health, safety and environmental
laws, rules and regulations."' Id. (quoting the trial court opinion).
181. Id. at 173, 556 S.E.2d at 771.
182. Id. (quoting the lease) (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 174, 556 S.E.2d at 772.
184. Id. at 173, 556 S.E.2d at 772.
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provision and determined that the plain meaning of the word "in-
tact" in the lease provision required Jewell Ridge to leave the
preparation plant 'physically and functionally complete.""'1 5 The
court also determined that the plain meaning of the term "'neces-
sary for [the plant's] operation' plainly means that the fixed ma-
chinery and equipment must be functional and capable of being
run."" 6 The court also determined, however, that even though the
plant had to be "functional and capable of being run," Jewell
Ridge did not have to upgrade the plant to current legal stan-
dards for preparation plans.18 7 A "functional plant," according to
the court, is "one that will perform in a physical sense, but not
necessarily in a legal sense." ' Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's ruling, but provided one modification. The court stated
that "[iif Pocahontas institutes an action for breach of contract
against Jewell Ridge, any damages for the breach shall be deter-
mined as of October 31, 2001, the final termination date of the
lease, and not as of 1979, the date operation of the plant
ceased."18 9
H. Mechanic's Lien
Reliable Constructors, Inc. v. CFJ Properties9 ° involved a me-
chanic's lien filed by Reliable Constructors, Inc. ("Reliable"), a
subcontractor, in the amount of $330,846.02 for labor and materi-
als for plumbing and mechanical work performed at a travel
plaza development in Caroline County. 91 Reliable filed a bill of
complaint to enforce the lien against Oakmont Corporation
("Oakmont"), the general contractor, CFJ Properties ("CFJ"), the
owner of the real estate, and Flying J, Inc. ("Flying J"), CFJ's
purported agent.'92 Oakmont, CFJ, and Flying J filed a motion to
dismiss the mechanics lien as invalid and unenforceable because
"the mechanic's lien memorandum included a sum due for labor
185. Id. at 173-74, 556 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1173 (1981)).
186. Id. at 174, 556 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting the lease).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. The court also stated that since Jewell Ridge failed to leave a functional prepa-
ration plant intact, it breached the lease. Id.
190. 263 Va. 279, 559 S.E.2d 681 (2002).
191. Id. at 280, 559 S.E.2d at 682.
192. Id.
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or materials furnished more than 150 days prior to the last day
on which labor was performed or material was furnished to the
job preceding the filing of that memorandum in violation of [Vir-
ginia] Code § 43-4." 1"3 The lien memorandum included a $250
charge for a fine levied by the Virginia Department of Labor and
Industry's Occupational Safety and Health Enforcement Division
for failing to provide a "hand wash" facility on site for Reliable's
employees. 19 4 According to the defendants, the fine was levied
"'212 days prior to the last day on which Reliable supplied labor
to the job."'195 The circuit court entered a final order dismissing
Reliable's bill of complaint to enforce the mechanic's lien.
196
On appeal, Reliable asserted that the circuit court erred be-
cause it failed to hear 'evidence on the nature, timing, and de-
tails of the administrative fine' levied by the Department of Labor
and Industry."197 Reliable admitted that it committed error when
it included the fine in the lien memorandum, but that Virginia
Code section 43-15 allows for curing of this error without invali-
dating the entire mechanic's lien.19 Virginia Code section 43-15
states that
No inaccuracy in the memorandum filed, or in the description of the
property to be covered by the lien, shall invalidate the lien, if the
property can be reasonably identified by the description given and
the memorandum conforms substantially to the requirements of §§
43-5, 43-8 and 43-10, respectively, and is not willfully false.
1 99
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court
should not have invalidated the lien without first permitting Re-
liable to submit evidence that including the fine in the mechanic's
lien memorandum constituted an inaccuracy within the context of
Virginia Code section 43-15.2o' The court went on to define the
term "inaccuracy" in the context of Virginia Code section 43-15 as
"'the condition of being inaccurate' and the term "inaccurate" as
193. Id. at 281, 559 S.E.2d at 682; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (es-
tablishing procedure for perfecting mechanic's liens).
194. Reliable Constructors, 263 Va. at 280, 559 S.E.2d at 682.
195. Id. at 281, 559 S.E.2d at 682 (quoting the motion to dismiss).
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Reliable's assignment of error).
198. Id.
199. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 43-15 (Repl. Vol. 2002)).
200. Id.
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In Jordan v. Commonwealth, °2 Charles and Elaine Jordan ap-
pealed a conviction for maintaining a public nuisance in violation
of Virginia Code section 48-3.203 The statute holds the owner of
real estate responsible for permitting the continuation of a nui-
sance on the owner's land even if the owner did not create or
cause the nuisance.2"4 The Jordans were the sole members of
Marquee, L.L.C. ("Marquee"), and Marquee was the owner of re-
cord of a banquet hall. °5 Marquee rented the banquet hall for
events, and the Commonwealth received numerous complaints
that it constituted a public nuisance because of increased noise
from traffic, car stereos, and pedestrians yelling in the street dur-
ing banquet hall events.0 6 The Jordans were convicted of main-
taining a public nuisance in the Richmond Circuit Court. 207 They
appealed their conviction to the Virginia Court of Appeals, which
reversed the conviction, stating that the Commonwealth failed to
prove that the Jordans were the owners of the banquet hall. °8
The court of appeals stated that "[t]itle to real property acquired
by the company vests in the company, Code § 13.1-1021, and a
member of the company is not a proper party to a proceeding by
or against the company, Code § 13.1-1020. "29 Thus, since the
property was owned by Marquee and not the Jordans, the Jor-
dans could not be held responsible for the public nuisance.210
201. Id. at 281-82, 559 S.E.2d at 682 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1139 (1986) (alterations in original)).
202. 36 Va. App. 270, 549 S.E.2d 621 (Ct. App. 2001).
203. Id. at 272, 549 S.E.2d at 622.
204. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-3 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
205. Jordan, 36 Va. App. at 273, 549 S.E.2d at 622.
206. Id. at 272, 549 S.E.2d at 622.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 276, 549 S.E.2d at 624.
209. Id. at 274, 549 S.E.2d at 623.
210. Id. at 276, 549 S.E.2d at 624.
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2. Private Nuisance and Trespass
The case of Martin v. Moore... involved a bill of complaint by
the Moores regarding the use of a joint gravel driveway and a
cross-bill by the Martins claiming that the Moores maintained a
nuisance and were guilty of trespass. 212 The Moores operated a
trucking business on property adjacent to the Martin property,
and the trucks used in their business traveled along the joint
gravel driveway serving both the Martin and Moore properties.213
The Martins claimed that "the trucking operation was excessively
noisy; created odor, dust, and excessive traffic on the driveway;
and caused dangerous and unsafe blockages of the entrance
road."214 The court reviewed the trial court's findings of fact and
found that the trial court did not err in determining that the
Martins failed to prove "substantial harm," a necessary element
in a successful private nuisance claim. 5
The Martins also complained that clearing operations and daily
truck washing on the Moore property caused silt to run off into a
pond on the Martins' property.21 6 The trial court found that the
activities on the Moore property did adversely impact the stream
flows into the Martins' pond and entered judgment in the amount
of $26,000 in favor of the Martins to cover the cost of removing
the silt and restoring the pond.21 7
211. 263 Va. 640, 561 S.E.2d 672 (2002).
212. Id. at 643, 561 S.E.2d at 674; see also supra Part II.E.l.b. for a discussion of the
easement dispute in this case.
213. Martin, 263 Va. at 643, 561 S.E.2d at 674.
214. Id. at 648, 561 S.E.2d at 677.
215. Id. at 647, 561 S.E.2d at 677. The Martins pointed to Bowers v. Westvaco Corp.,
244 Va. 139, 419 S.E.2d 661 (1982), as a case with similar factual circumstances. Martin,
263 Va. at 650, 561 S.E.2d at 678. In Bowers, Westvaco maintained a truck staging opera-
tion located approximately twenty-five feet from the Bowers' living room. Bowers, 244 Va.
at 143, 419 S.E.2d at 664. Vibrations from the trucks caused damage to the Bowers home,
and the operation's impact on the Bowers caused Mrs. Bowers to suffer emotional prob-
lems that caused the family to incur medical bills. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia
stated that Bowers was distinguishable from the Martin case for two reasons: (1) the pro-
cedural posture was different because the trial court in Bowers found that a private nui-
sance existed; and (2) the facts of the Bowers case were more egregious than the Martin
case. Martin, 263 Va. at 650, 561 S.E.2d at 678. The court also found persuasive the fact
that the Martins never complained about the Moores' trucking operations until after the
original bill of complaint was filed. Id.
216. Martin, 263 Va. 644, 561 S.E.2d at 674.
217. Id. at 644, 651, 561 S.E.2d at 675, 679.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court, stating
that the Martins had failed to "present sufficient evidence to
permit an intelligent and probable estimate of the amount" of
damages. 21" The court stated that while the Martins had pre-
sented evidence that it would cost $26,000 to remove 2,000 cubic
yards of silt from the pond, they had not presented evidence re-
garding the amount of silt actually in the pond.219
J. Roll-Back Tax
In Chesterfield County v. Stigall,22 ° the court considered
whether the division of one parcel of land subject to land use tax
assessments into two parcels and conveyance of the two parcels
triggered the requirement to pay roll-back taxes even though
there was no change in use of the parcels.2 2' The property in ques-
tion contained approximately 120 acres when Charles Stigall ac-
quired it in 1954.222 In 1975, Chesterfield County adopted an or-
dinance providing for reduced real estate tax assessments for
property devoted to agricultural, horticultural, forest or open
space uses, and the Stigall property was thereafter accepted into
the program.223 In 1979 or 1980, the Commonwealth of Virginia
acquired by eminent domain a portion of the Stigall property for
construction of a portion of Route 76, commonly known as the
"Powhite Parkway."224
After the taking, the property was split into two unequal sec-
tions, with twenty-six acres of the property lying north of the
218. Id. at 651, 561 S.E.2d at 679.
219. Id. at 651-52, 561 S.E.2d at 679. The court stated that
There was no evidence, such as data or test results, regarding cubic yards of
silt actually in the lake. There was no evidence of any measurements or ob-
servations to determine the depth of the silt, or whether the condition spread
over the entire lake bed or was limited to the area of the creek entrance.
Id.
220. 262 Va. 697, 559 S.E.2d 49 (2001).
221. Id. at 697, 554 S.E.2d at 49.
222. Id. at 700, 554 S.E.2d at 51. Stigall actually acquired two separate parcels by one
deed in 1954, with the second parcel containing approximately fifteen acres. Id. The fif-
teen acre parcel was not included in the land use assessment program, so it is not an issue
in the case. Id. at 700 n.1, 554 S.E.2d at 51 n.1.
223. Id. at 700, 554 S.E.2d at 51. Chesterfield County enacted the ordinance pursuant
to enabling legislation contained in Virginia Code sections 58.1-3229 to -3244 (Repl. Vol.
1997 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
224. Id.'
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Powhite Parkway and eighty-four acres lying south of that high-
way.225 Chesterfield County thereafter continued to tax the prop-
erty as one parcel even though the two portions were separated
by the Powhite Parkway. 2 6 Mr. Stigall took no action to cause a
legal separation or subdivision of the parcel into two separate
parcels of record.227
Charles Stigall died in 1998.22 On October 7, 1999, his widow,
Margaret Stigall, conveyed the portion of the parcel south of the
highway to The Margaret B. Stigall Living Trust, and she also
conveyed the portion of the parcel north of the highway to The
Stigall Family Limited Partnership.229 On December 27, 1999,
Chesterfield County assessed roll-back taxes against both par-
cels,23° citing Virginia Code section 58.1-3241(A) as the County's
authority for the assessment.23' Virginia Code section 58.1-
3241(A) requires the payment of roll-back taxes for portions of
properties subdivided, separated, or split-off from a parcel that is
in the special land use assessment program, but it does not re-
quire the payment of roll-back taxes for the "remaining real es-
tate" so long as that remaining real estate still qualifies for the
program.232
The circuit court determined that the property had been split
off by the Commonwealth when it took a portion of the property
by eminent domain; thus, the circuit court reasoned that since the
separation was not the result of "'an action of the owner,"' the
roll-back tax requirement was not triggered.233
225. Id.
226. Id. at 700-01, 554 S.E.2d at 51.
227. Id. at 701, 554 S.E.2d at 51.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. Under the land use assessment program, if a triggering event occurs, the prop-
erty owner is obligated to pay a one-time roll-back tax. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3241(A)
(Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 2002). Triggering events include a change in use of a parcel
or a re-zoning of a parcel to a use not permitted for inclusion in the land use program. See
Stigal, 262 Va. at 703, 554 S.E.2d at 52. The roll-back tax represents "the difference be-
tween the actual tax paid under the special land use tax program and the tax which would
have been due had the real estate been taxed on its fair market value assessment during
'the five most recent complete tax years."' Id. at 701, 554 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3237(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 2002)).
231. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3241(A) (Rep. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
232. Id.
233. Stigall, 262 Va. at 702, 554 S.E.2d at 52.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed that no roll-back taxes
were due as a result of the conveyances, but for different rea-
sons."' First, the court stated that the taking by the Common-
wealth did not cause a "'separation or split-off of that property as
contemplated by Code § 58.1-3241(A)." 235 That fact notwithstand-
ing, the court determined that Virginia Code section 58.1-3241(A)
was inapplicable in this case, stating that
Code § 58.1-3241(A) is only applicable when the conveyance or other
action of the owner of real estate causes a separation or split-off of
lots, pieces, or parcels of land "from the real estate which is being
valued, assessed and taxed" under a local special land use tax ordi-
nance. The "remaining real estate" continues to receive the benefit of
reduced assessment and taxation "without liability for roll-back
taxes" provided it continues to qualify for beneficial treatment. Thus,
by its express terms, this statute contemplates a separation or split-
off of a portion of the real estate in such a manner that there is a
"remaining" portion of the original parcel. It does not contemplate or
address the conveyance of the original parcel in its entirety by the
owner. Rather, when the owner conveys the real estate in its entirety
to a new owner or owners either as one parcel or as separate "lots,
pieces or parcels," the liability to roll-back taxes, if any, is controlled
by the provisions of Code § 58.1-3237(D). 236
K. Land Use Cases
1. Interpretation and Enforcement of Conditions and Voluntary
Proffers
a. Conditions Regulating Alcohol Sales
In County of Chesterfield v. Windy Hill, Ltd.,237 Windy Hill,
Ltd., ("Windy Hill") operated an outdoor recreational establish-
ment on property leased from E. M. Ciejek, Inc. Windy Hill op-
erated its business subject to a conditional use permit issued by
Chesterfield County, which stipulated that no alcoholic beverages
would be permitted on the property. 239 Even though the condi-
234. Id. at 704, 554 S.E.2d at 53.
235. Id. at 705, 554 S.E.2d at 54.
236. Id. at 706, 554 S.E.2d at 54 (footnote omitted) (alteration in original).
237. 263 Va. 197, 559 S.E.2d 627 (2002).
238. Id. at 201, 559 S.E.2d at 628.
239. Id. at 201, 559 S.E. 2d at 629.
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tional use permit purported to disallow the sale of alcoholic bev-
erages, Windy Hill applied to the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage
Control Board ("ABC Board") for a license to sell and serve beer
on the property. 40 Over objections of Chesterfield County, the
ABC Board issued the license.241 Chesterfield County then filed a
bill of complaint to enjoin Windy Hill from serving alcohol on the
property.242 On Windy Hill's motion for summary judgment, the
circuit court found in favor of Windy Hill, deciding that the alco-
hol prohibition in the conditional use permit conflicted with the
powers of the ABC Board, contrary to Virginia Code section 4.1-
128(A).243
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court.
2 44
The court cited its opinion in City of Norfolk v. Tiny House, Inc.,45
for the proposition that "'exclusive authority to license and regu-
late the sale and purchase of alcoholic beverages in Virginia does
not preclude a municipality from utilizing valid zoning ordinances
to regulate the location of an establishment selling alcoholic bev-
erages.' ' 246 The court agreed that the Windy Hill case was gov-
erned by the Tiny House case, stating that the court found no con-
flict between the ABC Board's authority to regulate the use or
dispensing of alcoholic beverages and a locality's authority to
regulate the location of the establishment selling such bever-
ages. 247
b. Enforcement of Proffered Conditions
The case of Jefferson Green Unit Owners Ass'n v. Gwinn248 in-
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 201-02, 559 S.E.2d at 629.
243. Id. at 202, 559 S.E.2d at 629. Virginia Code section 4.1-128(A) provides in perti-
nent part that "no county, city or town shall.., adopt any ordinance or resolution which
regulates or prohibits the manufacture.... drinking, use.... or dispensing of alcoholic
beverages in the Commonwealth." VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-128(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002). Vir-
ginia Code Section 4.1-128(C) provides in pertinent part that "all local acts, including
charter provisions and ordinances of cities and towns, inconsistent with any of the provi-
sions of this title, are repealed to the extent of such inconsistency." Id. § 4.1-128(C).
244. Windy Hill, 263 Va. at 200, 559 S.E.2d at 628.
245. 222 Va. 414, 281 S.E.2d 836 (1981).
246. Windy Hill, 263 Va. at 200, 559 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Tiny House, 222 Va. at 423,
281 S.E.2d at 841).
247. Id. at 204, 559 S.E.2d at 630.
248. 262 Va. 449, 551 S.E.2d 339 (2001).
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volved the enforceability of a voluntarily proffered zoning condi-
tion.249 When seeking an amendment to the zoning for the Jeffer-
son Green condominium development in 1981, the developer
submitted a voluntarily proffered condition that required the de-
veloper to purchase one membership per unit in the Bren Mar
Park Recreation Association ("Bren Mar").250 The condition also
required that the Jefferson Green Unit Owners Association, (the
"Association") would pay annual dues to Bren Mar.2 51 In 1999, the
Association discontinued paying dues to Bren Mar, and Jane W.
Gwinn, Fairfax County Zoning Administrator, brought suit
against the Association to enforce the proffered condition.252 The
Association filed a cross-bill seeking to declare the condition un-
constitutional as "forced association" in violation of the United
States Constitution, invalid as special legislation under the Vir-
ginia Constitution, and invalid under Virginia Code sections 15.2-
2297 and 15.2-1102.253 The circuit court upheld the validity of the
proffered condition under Virginia Code section 15.2-2297,254 but
then found that the proffer constituted special legislation in viola-
tion of Article IV, section 14(18) of the Virginia Constitution,255
and that it violated the "freedom of association" provisions of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 6 The con-
stitutional problems notwithstanding, the circuit court deter-
mined that the condition must be enforced against the Associa-
tion because the Association had consented to the condition's
adoption by virtue of their status as successor-in-interest to the
developer.257
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the proffered condition
and reversed the circuit court's determination that the condition
violated the United States Constitution and the Virginia Consti-
249. Id. at 453, 551 S.E.2d at 341.
250. Id. at 453-54, 551 S.E.2d at 341. The arrangement with Bren Mar was created in
lieu of the developer building recreation facilities as part of the Jefferson Green develop-
ment. Id. The Bren Mar recreation facilities were nearby to the Jefferson Green develop-
ment. Id. at 460, 551 S.E.2d at 345.
251. See id. at 454, 551 S.E.2d at 341.
252. Id. at 454, 551 S.E.2d at 341-42.
253. Id. at 454, 551 S.E.2d at 342.
254. Id. at 454-55, 551 S.E.2d at 342.
255. Id. at 461, 551 S.E.2d at 346.
256. Id. at 462, 551 S.E.2d at 346.
257. Id. at 455, 551 S.E.2d at 342.
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tution.25 First, the court rejected the Association's argument that
former Virginia Code section 15.1-491.2 (recodified as 15.2-2297)
prohibited Fairfax County from accepting a proffered condition
that required the payment for, or construction of, off-site im-
provements. 2 9 The court pointed out that at the time the proffer
was submitted, Fairfax County operated under the urban execu-
tive form of government.26 ° The section 15.1-491.2 prohibition
against accepting proffers for construction of off-site improve-
ments only applied to counties with the urban executive form of
government that opted to impose such a restriction.2 1 Fairfax
County did not impose that restriction in its zoning ordinance.262
The court also stated that the proffer did not amount to special
legislation because it bore a reasonable relation to the legislative
goal of providing recreational facilities to the citizens of Fairfax
County.263 Finally, the court determined that the proffer did not
violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
because "the affected association is not one involving intimate
human relationships or activities specifically protected by the
First Amendment. Instead, it is only a generalized 'social associa-
tion,' which is not a right recognized by the Constitution. 264
2. Interpretations of Zoning Ordinances by Boards of Zoning
Appeal
a. Mobile Home as a Nonconforming Use
In City of Emporia Board of Zoning Appeals v. Mangum,265
Wayne Mangum owned a mobile home park where he leased
spaces for mobile homeowners to place their mobile homes.266 Mr.
Mangum's park existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordi-
258. Id. at 462, 551 S.E.2d at 346-47.
259. Id. at 457, 551 S.E.2d at 343.
260. Id. at 456, 551 S.E.2d at 343.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 457, 551 S.E.2d at 343.
263. Id. at 459, 551 S.E.2d at 345.
264. Id. at 462, 551 S.E.2d at 346 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25
(1989)).
265. 263 Va. 38, 556 S.E.2d 779 (2002). This case was "overturned" by the General As-
sembly by an amendment to Virginia Code section 15.2-2307 (Cum. Supp. 2002). See infra
notes 535-36 and accompanying text.
266. Mangum, 263 Va. at 39-40, 556 S.E.2d at 780.
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nance in Emporia, and the park became a nonconforming use
upon enactment of that ordinance.267 A fire destroyed one of the
mobile homes in the park, and the City Manager for Emporia ad-
vised Mangum that he could not allow a tenant to replace the
mobile home because the park was nonconforming and a "new
mobile home 'may not be substituted upon damage to 50% of its
value.' 268 Mangum appealed the City Manager's determination to
the Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA"), which upheld the City
Manager's determination.6 9 Mangum appealed the BZA's deci-
sion to the circuit court, which subsequently reversed the BZA's
decision."'
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court and
found that the City Manager's interpretation of the City's zoning
ordinance was correct.271 The City of Emporia Code states, in
relevant part, that "' [n]o nonconforming building or use shall be
enlarged, extended, reconstructed, substituted, or structurally al-
tered, except when required by law or order, unless the use
thereof is changed to a use permitted in the district in which lo-
cated ... .,272 The court analyzed Emporia's zoning ordinance and
determined that it was unambiguous with regard to nonconform-
ing uses.273 The court then stated that when reviewing a decision
of a board of zoning appeals, the decision is presumed to be cor-
rect on appeal unless the appealing party shows that "the board
applied erroneous principles of law or that the board's decision
was plainly wrong and in violation of the purpose and intent of
the zoning ordinance. "22" The court stated that the plain meaning
of the ordinance "prohibits the substitution of a nonconforming
building except under certain prescribed conditions, which are
not present" in the Mangum case.27 Further, the court noted that
a mobile home is a building under the definition contained in the
Emporia Code.2 76 The court also determined that the City Man-
267. Id. at 40, 556 S.E.2d at 780.
268. Id. at 40, 556 S.E.2d at 781 (quoting EMPORIA, VA., CODE § 90-12 (1972))..
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 42, 556 S.E.2d at 782.
272. Id. at 41, 556 S.E.2d at 781 (quoting EMPORIA, VA., CODE § 90-12).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 42, 556 S.E.2d at 781-82 (citations omitted).
275. Id. at 42, 556 S.E.2d at 782.
276. Id. The City of Emporia Code defines the term "building" as "a structure having a
roof supported by columns or walls for the shelter, support or enclosure of persons, ani-
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ager was correct in holding that the mobile home use constituted
a nonconforming activity.277 Given these circumstances, the court
held that the BZA did not apply erroneous principles of law and
was not plainly wrong in its decision.278
b. Defining a Use in a Zoning Ordinance
In Fritts v. Carolinas Cement Co.,279 Carolinas Cement Com-
pany ("Carolinas Cement") applied for a by-right use application
with the Warren County Department of Planning and Zoning for
approval to construct a bulk cement and flyash terminal.28 ° The
application stated that the terminal constituted a "warehousing
and distribution" facility, a by-right use in the industrial park
where Carolinas Cement intended to locate.28 ' Carolinas Cement
intended to transport flyash and bulk cement by rail car to the fa-
cility, where the materials would then be stored in silos until
processed and carried away by truck.28 2 The property subject to
the application is located in an industrial park.
28 3
The Warren County Economic Development Authority ("EDA")
owned the particular parcel that Carolinas Cement intended to
purchase.28 4 Carolinas Cement intended to-and did-purchase
the property from the EDA.285 Joyce and Tommy Fritts, nearby
homeowners, appealed the approval of the by-right use applica-
tion to the Warren County Board of Zoning Appeals.2 6 The Fritt-
ses argued that the terminal constituted a storage yard, a use
that requires a conditional use permit under the zoning district
regulations for the industrial park.28 7 The Board of Zoning Ap-
peals upheld the approval of the by-right use application, and the
mals or chattels." EMPORIA, VA., CODE § 90-1.
277. Magnum, 268 Va. at 42, 556 S.E.2d at 782.
278. Id.
279. 262 Va. 401, 551 S.E.2d 336 (2001).
280. Id. at 403, 551 S.E.2d at 337-38.
281. Id. at 403, 551 S.E.2d at 338.
282. Id. at 403, 551 S.E.2d at 337.
283. Id. at 402, 551 S.E.2d at 337.
284. Id. at 402-03, 551 S.E.2d at 337.
285. Id. at 403, 551 S.E.2d at 337.
286. Id. at 403-04, 551 S.E.2d at 337-38.
287. Id. at 404, 551 S.E.2d at 338.
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circuit court upheld the Board of Zoning Appeals' decision on ap-
peal.2
88
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the circuit court's deci-
sion.289 The court analyzed the zoning ordinance and found that
the ordinance did not define the word "warehousing."29" The court
therefore looked to the dictionary definition of the word, which
defined "warehouse" as "'a structure or room for the storage of
merchandise or commodities.' 291 The silos, the court determined,
clearly fell within the definition of a "warehouse" because it
stores commodities such as the dry cement and flyash.29 2 The
court noted that the operation also qualified as a "distribution fa-
cility" under the Warren County zoning ordinance. 293 Thus, the
court determined that the circuit court did not err in upholding
the determination made by the Warren County Board of Zoning
Appeals.294
3. Denial of a Special Use Permit
In balancing the concerns for protection of the commercial
poultry industry, the Supreme Court of Virginia held in Board of
Supervisors of Rockingham County v. Stickley 295 that the Rock-
ingham County Board of Supervisors did not act arbitrarily, ca-
priciously, or unreasonably in denying a special use permit for a
game bird shooting preserve.296 Dr. William Stickley, a poultry
farmer in Rockingham County, raised upland game birds in pens
on his poultry farm, and he released the birds on his property for
hunting during the regular hunting season.297 Stickley applied for
and obtained a license to operate a shooting preserve on the prop-
288. Id. at 403-04, 551 S.E.2d at 238.
289. Id. at 406, 551 S.E.2d at 339.
290. Id. at 405, 551 S.E.2d at 339.
291. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2576 (1993)).
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing WARREN COUNTY, VA., CODE § 180-8 (1996) (defining a distribution fa-
cility as "[an establishment engaged in the receipt, storage and distribution of goods,
products, cargo and materials, including transshipment by rail, air or motor vehicle")).
294. Id. at 406, 551 S.E.2d at 339.
295. 263 Va. 1, 556 S.E.2d 748 (2002).
296. Id. at 11-12, 556 S.E.2d at 754.
297. Id. at 3, 556 S.E.2d at 749.
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erty surrounding his commercial poultry operation."' Thereafter,
on the advice of the Rockingham County Zoning Administrator,
Stickley submitted an application for a special use permit to op-
erate a shooting preserve, including the raising of game birds to
be released for hunting on the shooting preserve.299 After conduct-
ing two public hearings and receiving input from the Poultry
Federation and several poultry companies, the Rockingham
County Board of Supervisors denied the special use permit.30 0 The
basis of that decision hinged on the fear that the game birds
would spread avian diseases to the commercial poultry operations
in Rockingham County.31 At trial, Stickley presented three ex-
perts in the area of avian diseases and poultry farming who testi-
fied that the risk of commercial poultry flocks being infected with
avian diseases by game birds was minimal, but not nonexis-
tent.0 2 The Board of Supervisors presented an expert in avian
diseases, Dr. Elizabeth Krushinskie, who stated that the biosecu-
rity measures used to prevent infections of commercial poultry
flocks are effective, but not perfect, and that the risk of infection
for commercial flocks from game birds could increase if the game
birds are bred and concentrated on Stickley's farm.0 3 The circuit
court overturned the Board of Supervisors' decision, holding that
it was not fairly debatable and was therefore "unreasonable, arbi-
trary and capricious."3 °4
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated the test for reviewing a
local government's approval or denial in a zoning action as fol-
lows:
If the presumptive reasonableness of zoning action is challenged by
probative evidence of unreasonableness, the challenge must be met
by evidence of reasonableness. If such evidence of reasonableness is
sufficient to make the issue fairly debatable, the legislative action
must be sustained; if not, the presumption is defeated by the evi-
298. Id. at 5, 556 S.E.2d at 750.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 5-6, 556 S.E.2d at 750-51.
301. Id. at 6, 556 S.E.2d at 751. Commercial poultry production is one of the primary
industries in Rockingham County. Id. at 3, 556 S.E.2d at 744 ("The county ranks among
the top ten nationwide in turkey production. Three of the top ten taxpayers in the county
are poultry producers employing more than 8,500 people in 1999, not counting individuals
who are 'poultry farmers."').
302. Id. at 7-9, 556 S.E.2d at 752-53.
303. Id. at 10-11, 556 S.E.2d at 753-54.
304. Id. at 6, 556 S.E.2d at 751.
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dence of unreasonableness and the legislative act cannot be sus-
tained." 5
In the present case, the court stated that, even if one assumes
that Stickley presented probative evidence of unreasonableness,
the Board of Supervisors clearly presented evidence of reason-
ableness sufficient enough to make the question fairly debat-
able.3"6 The court stated that
the question in this case is not who presented the greatest number of
expert witnesses or even who won the battle of the experts.... In
our opinion, Dr. Krushinskie's common-sense appraisal of the "sig-
nificant risk" to poultry from the release of pen-raised game birds is
amply sufficient to make the issue fairly debatable.
30 7
4. Piecemeal Downzoning
A piecemeal zoning ordinance is generally considered
"one initiated by the zoning authority on its own motion; one selec-
tively addressed to landowners' single parcel and an adjacent parcel;
and one that reduces the permissible residential density below that
recommended by a duly-adopted [miaster [pilan ... ." [Tihese factors
are not exhaustive, and other factors may be considered when de-
termining whether a zoning ordinance is piecemeal .... 3os
When a court determines that a zoning ordinance amendment
constitutes piecemeal downzoning, the governing body must pre-
sent evidence of mistake, fraud, or changed circumstances war-
ranting the downzoning.3°9 The standard established for this de-
termination is as follows: "'[I]f the governing body produces
evidence sufficient to make reasonableness fairly debatable, the
ordinance must be sustained. If not, the ordinance is unreason-
able and void."'310 Historically, when the supreme court has de-
termined that a locality has enacted a piecemeal (rather than
comprehensive) downzoning, the court has struck down that ac-
305. Id. at 7, 556 S.E.2d at 751 (quoting County Bd. of Arlington v. Bratic, 237 Va. 221,
227, 377 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1989)).
306. Id. at 11, 556 S.E.2d at 754.
307. Id.
308. Turner v. Bd. of County Supervisors, 263 Va. 283, 289, 559 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2002)
(quoting Fairfax County v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 658, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893
(1974)).
309. Id. at 291, 559 S.E.2d at 687.
310. Id. (quoting Snell, 214 Va. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893).
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tion.31' The authors are aware of only one case decided by the su-
preme court which validated an action that it determined to be a
piecemeal downzoning. 312
With that background, the Supreme Court of Virginia recently
reviewed a piecemeal downzoning case, Turner v. Board of Super-
visors.313 In Turner, the Prince William County Board of Supervi-
sors downzoned approximately 0.22% of the county's land area.31 4
This downzoning reduced the permitted density of the affected
properties from four residential units per acre to one residential
unit per acre.3 15 Lea Turner ("Turner") and Anne Moncure Wall
("Wall") each owned a parcel of land that was affected by the
downzoning.316 Collectively, the Turner and Wall properties con-
stituted sixty-five percent of the land area affected by the down-
zoning."' Prince William County (the "County") argued that the
downzoning was in response to increases in traffic on roads in the
vicinity of the properties and impacts on the environment, includ-
ing increased silt runoff in area streams. 8
The court first determined that the zoning action was, in fact, a
piecemeal downzoning. 319 The court then analyzed the County's
argument that a change in circumstances occurred.32 ° One of the
issues on appeal involved that date from which the County had to
prove that a change in circumstances had occurred.321 The County
argued that the change had to be measured from 1958 when the
properties in question were first zoned to permit four residential
311. See, e.g., City of Virginia Beach v. Va. Land Inv. Ass'n No. 1, 239 Va. 412, 389
S.E.2d 312 (1990); Henrico County Bd. of Supervisors v. Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 222 Va.
218, 278 S.E.2d 859 (1981); Snell, 214 Va. at 661, 202 S.E.2d at 894.
312. See Seabrooke Partners v. City of Chesapeake, 240 Va. 102, 106-07, 393 S.E.2d
191, 193-94 (1990) (finding that a change in circumstances justified downzoning one par-
cel of land from multi-family uses to single family uses when the entire area around the
parcel had developed for single family uses).
313. 263 Va. 283, 559 S.E.2d 683 (2002).
314. Id. at 290, 559 S.E.2d at 686.
315. Id. at 290, 559 S.E.2d at 687.
316. Id. at 287, 559 S.E.2d at 685.
317. Id. at 290, 559 S.E.2d at 686-87.
318. Id. at 288, 559 S.E.2d at 688.
319. Id. at 289, 559 S.E.2d at 686. The court stated that "'[flor the [County] to argue
that the downzoning is anything but piecemeal ignores the reality."' Id. at 290, 559 S.E.2d
at 686 (quoting the circuit court's opinion) (citation omitted).
320. See id. at 291-96, 559 S.E.2d at 687-90.
321. Id. at 292, 559 S.E.2d at 687.
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units per acre.322 The court determined that the appropriate date
from which the change should be measured was 1991, the last
date that the County repealed and reenacted its zoning ordi-
nance.3 23 The court then determined that, as a matter of law, the
County failed to present sufficient evidence to support its argu-
ment that a change in circumstances justified the piecemeal
downzoning.324 First, the County failed to present any evidence as
to the traffic counts in 1991, which would have provided a base-
line with which to compare the traffic counts at the time of the
downzoning"25 Second, the County failed to present qua'ntitative
evidence that development on the property under the zoning clas-
sification enacted in 1958 would compound the problem of silt
build-up in area streams.3 26 The court also stated that the County
could not satisfy its "evidentiary burden by relying upon the po-
tential impact of future residential development on traffic condi-
tions."3
27
5. Freedom of Religion and Zoning Ordinance Restrictions
In the case of Thanh Van Tran v. Gwinn, 2 s the Supreme Court
of Virginia was called upon to determine whether the Fairfax
County Zoning Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad and violative of First Amendment 329 rights of religion,
speech, and association.3 3 0 Tran owned five acres in Fairfax
322. Id. at 292, 559 S.E.2d at 687-88.
323. Id. at 292-93, 559 S.E.2d at 688. The County's 1991 zoning ordinance contained
the following language:
The Zoning Ordinance of Prince William County, as herein presented, is
hereby adopted on October 22, 1991, and becomes effective at 5:00 p.m. on
November 21, 1991. The Zoning Ordinance of Prince William County as en-
acted May 4, 1982, and subsequently amended theretofore, is simultaneously
repealed, except those provisions expressly retained herein, upon this chapter
taking effect.
Id. (quoting PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VA., CODE art. II, § 32-200.06(i) (1991)).
324. Turner, 263 Va. at 293, 559 S.E.2d at 688.
325. Id. at 294, 559 S.E.2d at 689.
326. Id. at 296, 559 S.E.2d at 696.
327. Id. at 295, 559 S.E.2d at 689.
328. 262 Va. 572, 554 S.E.2d 63 (2001). The case commenced prior to enactment of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (2000), by the United States Congress, and thus the statute was not an issue in
this case.
329. Tran, 262 Va. at 577-78, 554 S.E.2d at 66; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
330. Tran, 262 Va. at 577-78, 554 S.E.2d at 66.
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County, which property was subject to the county's residential
conservation zoning district ("R-C District") regulations.331 The R-
C District regulations required the issuance of a special use per-
mit for certain "Group Uses," which include, among other things,
"Institutional Uses" such as churches and other places of worship,
"Community Uses," "Outdoor Recreation Uses," "Older Struc-
tures," "Temporary Uses," and "Uses Requiring Special Regula-
tion."33
2
Tran, a Buddhist monk and president of the Vietnamese Bud-
dhist Association ("VBA"), had been cited by the Fairfax County
zoning administrator on four occasions for conducting religious
services on his property without a special use permit.333 Tran ap-
pealed the fourth notice of violation to the Fairfax County Board
of Zoning Appeals, and the board upheld the zoning administra-
tor's determination. 334 Tran did not appeal the decision of the
board of zoning appeals.335 Thereafter, the zoning administrator
filed an action against Tran for declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief to enforce the R-C District regulations.336 Tran re-
sponded that he was not using the property for a place of worship,
that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,
and that the ordinance violated the First Amendment rights of re-
ligion, speech, and association.37 The circuit court found that
Tran was bound by the Board of Zoning Appeals' decision since he
failed to appeal.3 The circuit court then found in favor of Fairfax
County and enjoined Tran from violating the zoning ordinance.339
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the circuit court's deci-
sion with regard to the applicability of the zoning ordinance, but
vacated the injunction and remanded the case for entry of a dif-
ferent injunction consistent with the court's opinion.3 0 The court
concluded that the ordinance in question
331. Id. at 576, 554 S.E.2d at 65.
332. Id. at 580 n.5, 554 S.E.2d at 67 n.5.
333. Id. at 576, 554 S.E.2d at 65.





339. Id. at 577, 554 S.E.2d at 65-66.
340. Id. at 585, 554 S.E.2d at 70. The court determined that the injunction was over-
broad and not "tailored to the offensive activities" conducted by Tran. Id. Specifically, the
court determined that the trial court's injunction should not have required Tran to remove
shoe racks, a collection box, and a speaker system from his property. Id. at 584, 554 S.E.2d
at 70.
2002]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
requiring a special use permit to use property in the R-C district as a
synagogue, temple, church, or other place of worship imposes a
minimal and incidental burden on the constitutional right of free ex-
ercise of religion. The ordinance does not totally prohibit operation of
a church in the R-C district and any financial cost associated with
the permit process or relocation of the church does not impact any
religious belief or practice and thus is not of constitutional dimen-
sion.
3 4 1
The court also determined that the R-C District ordinance was
neutral because it applied to "Group Uses," which includes secu-
lar and non-secular uses, and not just to places of worship. 42
III. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
A. Billboards
The General Assembly defined the term "lawfully erected" as it
applies to outdoor advertising billboards to mean "any sign that
was erected pursuant to the issuance of a permit from the Com-
monwealth Transportation Commissioner under § 33.1-360
unless the local governing body has evidence of noncompliance
with ordinances in effect at the time the sign was erected."343 This
change clarifies Virginia Code section 33.1-370(E), which states
that "lawfully erected and maintained nonconforming signs, ad-
vertisements, and advertising structures shall not be removed or
eliminated by amortization under state law or local ordinances
without compensation. . .. ,,3"4 That same code section also pro-
vides that "[t]he Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner is
authorized to acquire by purchase, gift or the power of eminent
domain and to pay just compensation upon the removal of non-
conforming signs, advertisements or advertising structures law-fully erected and maintained under state law or state regula-
tions." '345 The General Assembly also clarified that the twenty-five
341. Id. at 580, 554 S.E.2d at 67 (footnote omitted). The court came to this conclusion
after surveying cases in a number of federal and state courts that dealt with similar facts.
See id. at 578-80, 554 S.E.2d at 66-69. In each of those cases, the courts upheld the ordi-
nance restrictions so long as those restrictions imposed only a minimal burden on the ex-
ercise of religion and did not discriminate among different religions. See id.
342. Id. at 582, 554 S.E.2d at 68.
343. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-351 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
344. Id. § 33.1-370(E) (Cum. Supp. 2002) (emphasis added).
345. Id. § 33.1-370(F) (emphasis added).
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dollar tax for the recordation of outdoor advertising sign leases
must be paid for "signs owned by a person engaged in the business
of outdoor advertising licensed by the Virginia Department of
Transportation ....
B. Business Trust Act
In an effort to provide more opportunities for the organization
of real estate investment trusts in Virginia, the General Assem-
bly enacted the Virginia Business Trust Act (the "Act").3 47 The Act
will not become effective until October 1, 2003,348 at which time it
will repeal the Real Estate Investment Trust Act. 49 The Act pro-
vides for the formation of a business trust,35 ° for the conversion
from one business entity to a business trust, and for the domesti-
cation of a foreign business trust.35' Because of the complexity of
the Act and the opportunities that it might present to the owners
of multiple real estate assets, the authors expect that there will
be a great deal of commentary forthcoming with regard to the Act
prior to its effective date.
C. Charitable Organizations
1. Land Held by the Trustees of a Church, Church Diocese,
Religious Congregation, or Religious Society
The Virginia Code limits the acreage that the trustees of a
church, church diocese, religious congregation, or religious society
may hold to fifteen acres of land within a city or town and two
hundred fifty acres "outside of a city or town within the same
346. Id. § 58.1-807(E) (Cum. Supp. 2002) (new language shown in italics). The new lan-
guage was substituted for the phrase "for which permit fees have been paid to" the Vir-
ginia Department of Transportation. See id. at § 58.1-807(E) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
347. S.B. 512, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 6, 2002, ch.
621, 2002 Va. Acts 488) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1-13.19:1, 6.1-343 to -351, 13.1-1200
to -1284, & 55-106.4 (Cum. Supp. 2002)). For further discussion of this Act, see C. Porter
Vaughan, III, et al., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Corporate and Business Law, 37 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
348. Va. S.B. 512.
349. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-343 to -351 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
350. Id. §§ 13.1-1209 to -1219 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
351. Id. §§ 13.1-1264 to -1277 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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county."352 The fifteen acre limitation can be increased to no more
than fifty acres of land in a city or town if the city or town passes
an ordinance permitting such an increase.353 However, any such
increase in the amount of acreage that such trustees may hold in
a city or town is subject to specific parameters as provided in an
amendment to Virginia Code section 57-12 enacted during the
2002 General Assembly.354 Specifically, the amendment permits
an increase above the fifteen acre limitation only
if such acreage is to be devoted exclusively, and is subsequently so
devoted, to (i) a church building, chapel, cemetery; (ii) offices exclu-
sively used for administrative purposes of the church; (iii) a Sunday
school or parochial school building or playgrounds thereof; (iv) park-
ing lots for the convenience of those attending any of the foregoing;
(v) administrative offices located on such church property leased by
the church to a nonprofit hospital; or (vi) a church manse, parsonage
or rectory.
355
In addition, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 57-12 to state that the Office of the Attorney General is
charged with enforcing this section on behalf of the affected city,
county, or town, and that the Office of the Attorney General is the
proper party to be named as defendant in any action challenging
the validity of section 57-12.35
2. Land Held by a Benevolent Association
Virginia Code section 57-20 places specified acreage limitations
on the amount of land that the trustees of certain benevolent as-
sociations may own.3 57 The 2002 General Assembly amended this
352. Id. § 57-12 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
353. Id.
354. See id.
355. Id. This new language is similar to language that was deleted from Virginia Code
section 57-12 during the 2001 General Assembly. See S.B. 943, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 15, 2001, ch. 253, 2001 Va. Acts 210) (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 57-12 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
356. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-12 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
357. See id. § 57-20. The Virginia Code does provide an explicit definition of the term
"benevolent association," but it is clear that the group must be an "unincorporated body or
society" that operates for charitable purposes. Id. § 57-18 (Repl. Vol. 1995). The Virginia
Code also provides that "benevolent associations" include
any society of Freemasons, Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance, posts of Veter-
ans of Foreign Wars or of the American Legion, Spanish War Veterans, Dis-
abled American Veterans and of other associations of veterans of the armed
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section to expand the groups that may hold up to thirty-five acres
to include "groups organized for rural community civic purposes
or improvement of farm life or operations of like purposes and not
for profit.. ,,35 The amendment specifies that "[a]ll such hold-
ings heretofore acquired are validated; except holdings which are
in litigation on or before July 1, 2002.""' 9
3. Constitutional Amendment Regarding Property Exempt From
Taxation
The General Assembly voted to submit to the voters in the
Commonwealth an amendment to section 6 of article X of the Vir-
ginia Constitution, which deals with property exempt from taxa-
tion.3 60 The amendment, if approved in the referendum, will allow
for the exemption from taxation for property "used by its owner
for religious, charitable, patriotic, historical, benevolent, cultural,
or public park and playground purposes, as may be provided by
classification or designation by... an ordinance adopted by the
local governing body .. ,361 As currently written, section 6 of ar-
ticle X of the Virginia Constitution permits the exemption from
taxation for such properties only after "a three-fourths vote of the
members elected to each house of the General Assembly ... 362
forces of the United States, or any other benevolent or literary associations,
or school league, or other groups organized for rural community civic pur-
poses or improvement of farm life or operations of like purposes and not for
profit ....
Id. § 57-19 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
358. Id. § 57-20 (Cum. Supp. 2002). The other group that has the same thirty-five acre
limitation is the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks. Id.
359. Id.
360. H.B. 36, Va. Gen Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 6, 2002, ch.
630, 2002 Va. Acts 543); see also VA. CONST. art. X. § 6.
361. Va. H.B. 36. (new language in italics).
362. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6, cl. 6.
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D. Condominium Associations, Property Owners'Associations
and Real Estate Cooperatives
1. Capital Reserve Accounts
The General Assembly amended both the Condominium Act 36 3
and the Property Owners' Association Act364 to require condomin-
ium associations and property owner associations to maintain
and audit capital reserve accounts.365 First the General Assembly
defined the term "capital components" as the items owned in
common by the condominium owners or the property owners, as
the case may be, for which they have "the obligation for repair,
replacement or restoration and for which" the governing body of
the association "determines funding is necessary."366 The General
Assembly then enacted requirements for those groups to conduct
a study every five years "to determine the necessity and amount
of reserves required to repair, replace and restore the capital
components."367 After the study is conducted, the unit owners' ex-
ecutive organ or the property owners' board of directors, as the
case may be, is required to review the results of the study on an
annual basis and make any adjustments necessary to maintain
reserves to pay for those capital components. 6 If the study indi-
cates a need for budget reserves, the association's governing body
is required to make adjustments to its budget to provide for those
capital components.369 Finally, the most current reserve study
must be included in any disclosure packets provided to purchas-
ers of a condominium unit or a property governed by a property
owners' association, as the case may be.37°
363. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
364. Id. §§ 55-508 to -516.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
365. Id. §§ 55-79.83:1(B)(2), -514(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002). These requirements will not
apply if the governing documents for the condominium association or the property owners'
association, as the case may be, require a more stringent standard with regard to capital
reserve accounts. Id. § 55-79.83:1(A) (regarding condominiums); Id. § 55-514(A) (regarding
property owners' associations).
366. Id. §§ 55-79.41, -509 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
367. Id. §§ 55-79.83:1(A)(1), -514.1(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
368. Id. §§ 55-79.83:1(A)(2)-(3), -514(A)(2)-(3).
369. Id. §§ 55-79.83:1(B)(1)-(3), -514(B)(1)-(3).
370. Id. §§ 55-79.97(C)(5), -512(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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2. Disqualification of a Condominium Owners' Association
Officer
The Virginia Code now requires that, unless the condominium
instruments require otherwise, a person is disqualified from be-
ing an officer of a condominium owners' association if that person
disposes of all his/her units in fee.371 Under prior law, unless the
condominium instruments provided otherwise, a person was dis-
qualified from being an officer of a condominium owners' associa-
tion if that person disposed of his/her interest in fee "and/or [dis-
posed of his/her interest in the unit] for a term or terms of six
months or more ....372
3. Property Owners' Association Disclosure Packets
As revised, the Property Owners' Association Act 73 now re-
quires that "[a] copy of the fully completed one-page cover sheet
developed by the Real Estate Board pursuant to § 54.1-2105.1" be
included as part of the association disclosure packet that must be
delivered from a seller to a purchaser.374 In addition, the informa-
tion contained in the disclosure packet obtained by a seller must
be current as of the date specified on the disclosure packet.
3 75
4. Taxation of Real Estate Cooperatives
The General Assembly amended the Virginia Real Estate Co-
operative Act (the "Co-op Act")376 to clarify the taxation of real es-
tate cooperatives. 7' First, the General Assembly stated that any
cooperative that qualifies as a real estate cooperative under the
Co-op Act "shall not be deemed to be a business for any state and
local purposes, including, but not limited to, liability for payment
of sales, meals, hotel, motel or gross receipts taxes and business
licenses, to the extent that it collects payments from residents of
371. Id. § 55-79.78(A).
372. Id. § 55-79.78(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
373. Id. §§ 55-508 to -516.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
374. Id. § 55-512(A)(14).
375. Id. § 55-511(C) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
376. Id. §§ 55-424 to -506 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
377. See id. § 55-428 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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the cooperative."3 7' Further, the Virginia Code now provides that
tangible personal property owned by a real estate cooperative
that would be considered household goods and personal effects if
those goods or effects were owned by an individual or family,
must be treated as if they were owned by an individual for pur-
poses of state and local taxation. 9
E. Consumer Real Estate Protection Act and Home Warranties
The 2002 General Assembly made two amendments to the
Consumer Real Estate Protection Act ("CRESPA").8 ° The first
amendment exempts any "title insurance company if such com-
pany's financial statements are audited annually by an independ-
ent certified public accountant" from the requirement that a set-
tlement agent have an audit of its escrow accounts conducted by a
certified public accountant at least once every twelve months.8 1
Prior to this amendment, only attorneys were exempt from this
auditing requirement.8 2 The second amendment expanded the
definition of a "settlement agent" to include "[a]ny person, other
than a party to the transaction, who conducts the settlement con-
ference and receives or handles money .... "383
In response to the result in the case of Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck,384
the General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to require the
purchaser of a new home who discovers any defects after July 1,
2002 to provide the home builder with written notice of those de-
fects before instituting legal actions against the home builder.8 '
The written notice must be sent by registered or certified mail to
the home builder's last known address, and the notice must state
the nature of the warranty claim.8 6 The home builder will have a
378. Id. § 55-428(F).
379. Id. § 55-428(G).
380. Id. §§ 6.1-2.19 to -2.29 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
381. Id. § 6.1-2.21(E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
382. Id. § 6.1-2.21(E)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
383. Id. § 6.1-2.20 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
384. 262 Va. 673, 554 S.E.2d 88 (2001) (discussed supra Part II.F).
385. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
386. Id. The revised language does not state whether the notice must be given prior to
the expiration of the applicable warranty period. See id.
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reasonable time period, not to exceed six months, to cure the de-
fect.38
7
F. Deeds of Trust, Priority of Mortgages, and Recordation of
Documents
1. Release of Deed of Trust
During the 2002 session, the General Assembly enacted several
amendments to the Virginia Code regarding obtaining and re-
cording a certificate of satisfaction for a deed of trust."' First, the
General Assembly clarified that the debtor may provide its lien
creditor with the name and address of the person to whom a cer-
tificate of satisfaction may be sent.8 9 In addition, a creditor now
may satisfy its requirement to record a full or partial certificate of
satisfaction by having that document delivered by hand courier
provided that the creditor obtains a receipt from the clerk's of-
fice. 390 The Virginia Code now also provides that if the owner of a
mortgage, deed of trust, vendor's lien, or other lien transfers that
lien to someone other than the original lien creditor, the new
owner is "subject to the same requirements ... for failure to com-
ply" with the requirement to provide certificate of satisfaction in
accordance with the applicable provisions of the Virginia Code.39 '
Another significant amendment to the Virginia Code involves
settlement agents who are licensed under CRESPA.392 The Vir-
ginia Code now authorizes settlement agents who have paid an
obligation secured by a mortgage or deed of trust to file a certifi-
cate of satisfaction evidencing a release of the satisfied lien in
certain limited circumstances.393 The settlement agent can exe-
387. Id.
388. See id. § 55-66.3(A)(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
389. Id. § 55-66.3(A)(1).
390. Id.
391. Id. § 55-66.3(A)(2). Under prior law, the new owner of the lien would only be liable
for recording a certificate of satisfaction that accrued during the new owner's ownership of
the lien. See id. § 55-66.3(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
392. See id. § 55-66.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
393. Id. This section applies to any lien created before or after July 1, 2002 and applies
only to transactions involving the liens against real estate located in the Commonwealth
containing no more than four residential dwelling units. Id. § 55-66.3(E)(5)(a)-(b). It also
applies only to complete releases of liens and does not apply to partial releases of liens. Id.
§ 55-66.3(E)(5)(c).
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cute and record the certificate of satisfaction even if that agent is
not named as a trustee under the deed of trust or the agent has
not received some other authority from the lienholder to release
the lien.3 94 However, the settlement agent can exercise this au-
thority only under specified procedures. First, the settlement
agent must submit a notice to the lienholder, which notice must
conform substantially to a statutory form.395 If, within ninety
days of the settlement agent's mailing of the notice of intent, the
lienholder fails to provide the settlement agent with evidence
that the certificate of satisfaction has been recorded, the settle-
ment agent may prepare and record a certificate of satisfaction.396
The settlement agent's certificate of satisfaction must be accom-
panied with a copy of the notice of intent sent to the lienholder
and an affidavit stating that the settlement agent has met the
statutory requirements to prepare and record the certificate of
satisfaction.397
2. Definition of a "Subordinate Mortgage"
Virginia Code section 55-58.3 provides guidance for determin-
ing when a refinance mortgage takes priority over a subordinate
mortgage. 39" The General Assembly amended the definition of a
"subordinate mortgage" in that section to include "a mortgage or
deed of trust securing an original principal amount not exceeding
$50,000, encumbering or conveying an interest in real estate con-
taining not more than one dwelling unit that is subordinate in
priority ... as a result of a previous refinancing."399
394. Id. § 55-66.3(E).
395. Id. § 55-66.3(E)(1)(a)-(b).
396. Id. § 55-66.3(E)(2)(a).
397. Id. The affidavit must certify:
(i) that the settlement agent has satisfied, and possesses satisfactory evi-
dence of payment of the obligation secured by the mortgage described in the
certificate; (ii) that the lien of the mortgage may be released; (iii) that the
person executing the certificate is the settlement agent or is duly authorized
to act on behalf of the settlement agent; and (iv) that the notice of intent to
release was delivered to the lien creditor or servicer and the settlement agent
received evidence of receipt of such notice by the lien creditor or servicer.
Id. § 55-66.3(E)(2)(b). The affidavit must be substantially in the form proscribed in the
amendment to Virginia Code section 55-66.3. See id. (providing a sample form of affidavit).
398. Id. § 55-58.3 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
399. Id. § 55-58.3(A) (new language in italics). Also included in the definition of a sub-
ordinate mortgage is a mortgage or deed of trust that is subordinate in priority under Vir-
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3. Grantor/Grantee Indexes; Electronic Filing
In recent years there has been significant pressure to conduct
business electronically rather than using paper. During the 2002
session, the General Assembly made one amendment to the Vir-
ginia Code that made it clear that using paper was still an ac-
ceptable practice for circuit court clerk's offices.400 In that
amendment, the General Assembly allowed a circuit court clerk's
office to maintain its grantor and grantee indexes on paper.40 1 In
another action, the General Assembly made it clear that elec-
tronic filings will continue to be promoted.40 2 Under new legisla-
tion, circuit court clerks are authorized to enter into agreements
with banks, mortgage companies, or other lending institutions
"for the purpose of electronically recording certificates of satisfac-
tion and assignments of the underlying notes secured by previ-
ously recorded deeds of trust."
40 3
4. Notary Public
The General Assembly more clearly defined the duty of care
that a notary public must exercise with regard to the identity of
any person whose identity is the subject of a notarial act.40 4 If the
notary is unfamiliar with the person subject to the notarial act,
the notary must ascertain that person's identity
by examination of one or more of the following documents: a United
States Passport, a certificate of United States citizenship, a certifi-
cate of naturalization, an unexpired foreign passport, an alien regis-
tration card with photograph, a state-issued driver's license or a
state-issued identification card or a United States military card.
40 5
ginia Code section 55-96(A)(1) "to a mortgage, deed of trust or other security interest in
real estate (otherwise known as the prior mortgage). . . ." Id.
400. Id. § 17.1-249(I) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
401. Id. A circuit court clerk already had authority to maintain his/her indexes "on
computer, word processor, microfilm, microfiche, or other micrographic medium.... Id.
402. Id. § 17.1-256 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
403. Id.
404. See id. § 47.1-14 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
405. Id.
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G. Eminent Domain
1. Repeal of Sunset Provision in Act of April 19, 2000, Chapter
1029
During the 2000 session, the General Assembly enacted some
broad-reaching and significant changes that impacted eminent
domain proceedings. °6 This legislation, which was set to expire
on July 1, 2002,407 made several changes to the Virginia Code.
First, it provides that property owners subject to eminent domain
proceedings have the right to have compensation awards deter-
mined by a jury.0 8 Second, it states that in negotiations to ac-
quire land for public use, agencies commencing such actions must
provide the owner of the property to be condemned a copy of the
agency's appraisal of the property to be taken.0 9 Third, it re-
quires the condemning agency to conduct a title search of the
property before making an offer to purchase the property or be-
fore filing a certificate of take, as the case may be.410 Fourth, it
requires the Virginia Department of Transportation to acquire
real estate appraisals from licensed real estate appraisers for any
fee simple acquisition that the department intends to acquire.411
Fifth, it permits tenants of land to be condemned who have a
lease of twelve months or longer to intervene in condemnation
proceedings to participate in the compensation proceedings.412
Further, the General Assembly repealed the sunset provisions,
thus making these changes permanent parts of the Virginia
Code.413
406. S.B. 453, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 19, 2000, ch.
1029, 2000 Va. Acts 2443) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25-46.3, -46.5, -46.9, -46.11,
-46.17, -46.19 to -46.22, -46.24, -46.25, -46.29, -46.32, and -248 (Repl. Vol. 2000); Id. §§
33.1-89, 36.27 (Cum Supp. 2000)).
407. Id.
408. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25-46.9, -46.20 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
409. Id. § 25-248 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
410. Id. § 25-46.5(C) (Repl. Vol. 2000); see also id. § 33.1-89 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (apply-
ing specifically to the Virginia Department of Transportation).
411. Id. § 33.1-89 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
412. Id. § 25-46.21:1 (Repl. Vol. 2000). See also supra Part II.A.2. for a discussion of
Lamar Corp. v. Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner, 262 Va. 375, 552 S.E.2d 61
(2001) (regarding tenant's involvement in eminent domain proceedings).
413. H.B. 844, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 5, 2002, ch.
1056, 2002 Va. Acts 1056).
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2. Pretrial Settlement Conferences
Under new legislation, either the property owner or the con-
demning authority may request that the parties have a pre-trial
settlement conference conducted by a neutral third party.414 The
pre-trial settlement conference must be held no sooner than
thirty days prior to trial, and the settlement conference is not
binding on the parties.415
3. Definition of an "Owner"
As discussed earlier in this article, one of the issues that has
been raised in condemnation litigation is who qualifies as an
"owner" in the condemnation proceedings.416 The General Assem-
bly clarified the meaning of the term "owner" by providing a defi-
nition for that term as it relates to eminent domain proceed-
ings." '  The definition specifically includes the owners of
"structures or improvements for which an outdoor advertising
permit has been issued by the Commonwealth Transportation
Commissioner .... "" However, the General Assembly also made
it clear that the definition of the term "owner" would "not alter in
414. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.17(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002). In addition, the General Assem-
bly amended Virginia Code section 36-27, deleting a similar pre-trial conference option
applicable only to condemnations arising under Title 36 of the Virginia Code; however, the
requirements of Virginia Code section 25-46.17 are incorporated by reference into section
36-27. See id. § 36-27 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
415. Id. § 25-46.17(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
416. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Lamar Corp., 262 Va. at 375, 552 S.E.2d at 61).
417. See VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.3 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (applying to general eminent do-
main provisions); id. § 25-238 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (applying to relocation assistance re-
quirements); id. § 33.1-89 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (applying to condemnation actions by the
Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner). Specifically, each of the foregoing sections
define "owner" as follows:
"Owner" means any person owning land, buildings, structures or improve-
ments upon land where such ownership is of record in the land records of the
clerk's office of the circuit court of the county or city where the property is lo-
cated. Owner shall not include trustees or beneficiaries under a deed of trust,
any person with a security interest in the property, or any person with a
judgment or lien against the property. In proceedings instituted by the Com-
monwealth Transportation Commissioner under this title or Title 33.1, owner
also includes persons owning structures or improvements for which an out-
door advertising permit has been issued by the Commonwealth Transporta-
tion Commissioner pursuant to § 33.1-360.
Id. §§ 25-46.3, -238, 33.1-89 (emphasis in original).
418. Id.
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any way the valuation of such land, buildings, structures or im-
provements under existing law."419
4. Limitation on Housing Authorities to Acquire Property in
Designated Areas of Norfolk
The General Assembly added a new section to the Virginia
Code that limits the authority of housing authorities to exercise
the power of eminent domain in certain areas of the City of Nor-
folk.42° Specifically, the new legislation states that
no housing authority transacting business and exercising powers as
provided in § 36-4 in the City of Norfolk shall be authorized after
July 1, 2007, to acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main, any real property located within the boundaries set forth in
the Conservation and Redevelopment Plan for the East Ocean View
Conservation and Redevelopment Project adopted July 1989, as
amended by Amendment No. 1 to such plan adopted September
1992.421
It is important to note that this legislation will not apply to
condemnation proceedings initiated prior to July 1, 2007.422
H. Enterprise Zones
Prior to the 2002 General Assembly Session, local governments
had the authority to establish by ordinance a local technology
zone for the promotion of technology based businesses. 42' The
General Assembly expanded this authority to allow local govern-
ments to establish a special taxation program for such zones as if
those zones were designated as enterprise zones.424 The locality
can designate such a technology zone and enact the accompany-
ing local enterprise zone taxation program for a technology zone
without first obtaining an enterprise zone designation from the
Governor. 5
419. Id.
420. Id. § 36-27.2 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
421. Id. (emphasis added).
422. Id.
423. Id. § 58.1-3850 (Rep. Vol. 2000).
424. Id. §§ 58.1-3245.12, -3850 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
425. Id. § 58.1-3245.12 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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I. Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act Amendments
The 2002 General Assembly made a number of amendments to
the Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act (the "Residential
Landlord Tenant Act"),426 including amendments to certain de-
fined terms including prepaid rent, security deposits, liquidated
damages for early termination by military personnel, and aban-
donment by a tenant of the premises and the tenant's property.
4 2 7
These amendments are discussed below.
1. Defined Terms
The General Assembly added the term "authorized occupant" to
the Residential Landlord Tenant Act, defining it as "a person en-
titled to occupy a dwelling unit with the consent of the landlord,
but who has not signed the rental agreement and therefore does
not have the rights and obligations as a tenant under the rental
agreement."4 2' This definition of "authorized occupant" affects the
definition of a "tenant" under the Residential Landlord Tenant
Act 9.42 As amended, the definition of "tenant" does not include "(i)
an authorized occupant, (ii) a guest or invitee, or (iii) any person
who guarantees or cosigns the payment of the financial obliga-
tions of a rental agreement but has no right to occupy a dwelling
unit. 4
30
Also the Residential Landlord Tenant Act definition of "secu-
rity deposit" was amended to delete "prepaid rent" as part of the
definition of the term "security deposit."43 1 Prepaid rent is now in-
cluded within the term "rent. '43 2 The term "security deposit" was
also amended to state that the term does not include "a bond or
commercial insurance policy purchased by a tenant to a landlord
to secure the performance of the terms and conditions of a rental
agreement."433
426. Id. §§ 55-248.2 to -248.40 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
427. See infra Part 111.1.1-5.
428. VA. CODE ANN. §55-248.4 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
429. Id.
430. Id. (emphasis added).
431. Id.
432. Id. Prepaid rent is discussed infra Part 111.1.2.
433. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.4 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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2. Prepaid Rent
Under a new provision of the Virginia Code, tenants may offer
and landlords may accept prepaid rent.434 If a landlord receives
prepaid rent, the landlord has five business days to place the pre-
payment funds in an escrow account with a federally insured de-
pository in Virginia.435 The funds must remain in the escrow ac-
count until the prepaid rent becomes due, and the landlord is
forbidden from removing the funds from escrow before they be-
come due unless the tenant gives the landlord prior written con-
sent.436
3. Security Deposits
As stated above, the General Assembly clarified the definition
of a "security deposit" to state that it also does "not include a
bond or commercial insurance policy purchased by a tenant to se-
cure the performance of the terms and conditions of a rental
agreement."437 In furtherance of this change, the General Assem-
bly also amended the provisions that are prohibited from inclu-
sion in rental agreements.43 Specifically, a rental agreement may
not contain a provision that a tenant agree "to both the payment
of a security deposit and the provision of a bond or commercial in-
surance policy purchased by the tenant to secure the performance
of the terms and conditions of a rental agreement."439
4. Limitations on Liquidated Damages Provisions for Early
Termination by Military Personnel
The Residential Landlord Tenant Act permits a member of the
United States armed forces or a member of the Virginia National
Guard who is serving on full-time duty or as a Civil Service tech-
nician with a National Guard unit (collectively, "military person-
nel") to terminate a rental agreement under specified circum-
434. Id. § 55-248.7:1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. § 55-248.4 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
438. Id.
439. Id. § 55-248.9(A)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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stances.44 ° If military personnel cause an early termination in ac-
cordance with those specified circumstances, the landlord is lim-
ited to collecting liquidated damages equal to one month's rent if
the tenant completes less than six months of the tenancy as of the
effective date of termination."' The landlord is also limited to col-
lecting liquidated damages equal to one-half of one month's rent
if the tenant completes at least six months but less than twelve
months of the tenancy as of the effective date of the termina-
tion.442 However, prior to this year, the liquidated damages provi-
sion was silent as to what, if any, liquidated damages a landlord
could collect from military personnel if the termination date was
after twelve months of the tenancy was completed. 43 The General
Assembly resolved this ambiguity by amending the Residential
Landlord Tenant Act to state that a landlord can collect no liqui-
dated damages from military personnel who terminate their
leases early due to the specified circumstances discussed above
and who have completed at least twelve months of their lease
term prior to the early termination date.444
5. Tenant Abandonment
If a landlord is unsure whether a tenant has abandoned the
leased premises, the landlord now has a process to follow to de-
termine whether a tenant has abandoned the premises.44 First,
the landlord must serve the tenant with written notice requiring
the tenant to give the landlord written notice within seven days
"that the tenant intends to remain in occupancy of the prem-
ises."446 If the tenant gives notice of his/her intent to remain or
the landlord otherwise determines that the tenant has not aban-
doned the premises, the landlord may not treat the premises as
abandoned.447 If, within seven days of delivery of the notice, the
tenant fails to respond and the landlord does not otherwise de-
440. Id. § 55-248.21:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
441. Id. § 55-248.21:1(C)(1).
442. Id. § 55-248.21:1(C)(2).
443. Id. § 55-248.21:1(C) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
444. Id. § 55-248.21:1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
445. Id. § 55-248.33 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
446. Id. See generally id. § 55-248.6 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (stating the requirements for
notice).
447. Id. § 55-248.33 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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termine that the tenant has not abandoned the premises, "there
shall be [a] rebuttable presumption that the premises have been
abandoned by the tenant and the rental agreement shall be
deemed to terminate on that date."44 The landlord is then re-
quired to begin mitigating damages.449
In addition to the procedure for determining whether a tenant
has abandoned the premises, the Residential Landlord Tenant
Act now has a specific procedure for disposing of abandoned prop-
erty left in the premises by a tenant.45 ° The landlord has three op-
tions for giving notice to the tenant of the landlord's intent to dis-
pose of the abandoned property.45' First, the landlord may give
the tenant a termination notice that includes a statement that
the property left in the premises will be disposed of within
twenty-four hours after termination of the rental agreement.45 2
Second, if the landlord uses the aforementioned procedure to de-
termine whether the tenant has abandoned the premises, the
landlord can include in his notice to the tenant a statement that
any personal property left in the premises will be "disposed of
within the twenty-four hour period after expiration of the seven-
day notice period." '453 Third, the landlord may give a separate no-
tice to the tenant that "includes a statement that any items of
personal property left in the premises would be disposed of within
twenty-four hours after expiration of a ten-day period from the
date such notice was given to the tenant."454 The tenant has "the
right to remove his personal property from the premises at rea-
sonable times during the twenty-four hour period after termina-
tion or at such other reasonable times until the landlord has dis-
posed of the [tenant's] remaining personal property."455 The
landlord has no "liability for the risk of loss for such personal
property" during the twenty-four hour period and until the land-
448. Id.
449. Id.; see id. § 55-248.35 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (stating landlord's obligation to mitigate
damages).
450. Id. § 55-248.38:1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
451. Id. In each instance, the landlord must follow the notice requirements contained
in the Residential Landlord Tenant Act. See id. § 55-248.6 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (stating the
requirements for notice).
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lord disposes of the tenant's personal property." 6 If the landlord
fails to provide the tenant with "reasonable access" to the tenant's
personal property during the specified periods, the tenant has a




The items that can be included in the fifty-dollar threshold for
filing a mechanics lien have been expanded to include "the rea-
sonable rental or use value of equipment .... ,,45' The General As-
sembly also enacted an amendment that requires a subcontractor
furnishing labor or materials to a general contractor or other sub-
contractor to give both a preliminary and second written notice
stating the nature and character of the subcontractor's contract
and the probable amount of his claim.459 Prior to this amendment,
the subcontractor only had to provide the general contractor or
other subcontractor with one notice of the subcontractor's
claim.46°
K. Sanitary Districts and Service Districts
Localities now have the authority to base a special assessment
tax for properties in sanitary districts and service districts on the
full assessed value of the taxable property in the district, even if a
property in the district is subject to a special use value assess-
ment.461 The locality can only make such an assessment with the
written consent of the property owner.462 The General Assembly
also included Goochland County among the jurisdictions that may
enact an ordinance that provides "that taxes or charges hereafter
made, imposed or incurred for water or sewers or use thereof
within or outside such county or city shall be a lien on the real es-
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. § 43-3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
459. Id. § 43-11 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
460. Id. § 43-11 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
461. Id. § 15.2-2403(6) (Cum. Supp. 2002) (regarding service districts); id. § 21-118(6)
(Cum. Supp. 2002) (regarding sanitary districts).
462. Id. § 21-118(6) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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tate served by such waterline or sewer."463 Finally, the General
Assembly granted local governments the authority to establish
open space service districts for the purpose of acquiring "by pur-
chase, gift, devise, bequest, grant or otherwise title to or any in-
terests or rights of not less than five years' duration in real prop-
erty that will provide a means for the preservation or provision of
open-space land as provided for in the Open-Space Land Act (§
10.1-1700 et seq.)."464 However, the locality may not use the
power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring property
for an open-space service district.465
L. Sale or Lease of Property Owned by the Commonwealth
Prior to the sale or lease of state-owned property, the Depart-
ment of General Services now is required to "request the written
opinion of the Secretary of Natural Resources as to whether the
property to be sold is a significant component of the Common-
wealth's natural or historic resources, and, if so, how those re-
sources should be protected in the sale of the property." 6 The
Secretary of Natural Resources is required to provide his/her re-
view of the sale "within fifteen business days of receipt of full in-
formation" from the Department of General Services.467
The 2002 General Assembly provided that the Department of
State Police can receive and retain in-kind goods or services for
leases or conveyances of an interest in a Department of State Po-
lice communications tower or site.46 The in-kind goods or services
must be "used in the operation, acquisition, maintenance, con-
struction or replacement of communication towers, sites, and sys-
tems of the department."469 If the Department of State Police en-
ters into an agreement for in-kind goods or services, such
463. Id. § 15.2-2118 (Cum. Supp. 2002). This section also provides that "[wihere resi-
dential rental real estate is involved, no lien shall attach (i) unless the user of the water or
sewer services is also the owner of the real estate or (ii) unless the owner of the real estate
negotiated or executed the agreement by which such water or sewer services were pro-
vided to the property." Id.
464. Id. § 15.2-2403(11) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
465. Id.
466. Id. § 2.2-1156(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
467. Id.
468. Id. § 2.2-1150.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
469. Id.
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agreement need not be reviewed and approved by the Department
of General Services.47 °
M. Real Estate Taxes
During the 2002 session, the General Assembly enacted four
noteworthy changes to the real estate tax provisions contained in
the Virginia Code. The first change involves the minimum acre-
age requirements for inclusion in the open-space use designation
under a locality's special land use assessment program.4 1' The
Virginia Code now provides that
for real estate adjacent to a scenic river, a scenic highway, a Virginia
Byway or public property in the Virginia Outdoors Plan or for any
real estate in any city, county or town having a density of population
greater than 5,000 per square mile, for any real estate in any county
operating under the urban county executive form of government, or
the unincorporated Town of Yorktown chartered in 1691, the govern-
ing body may by ordinance prescribe that land devoted to open-space
uses consist of a minimum of one quarter of an acre.
4 72
The Virginia Code provides the authority for certain localities
to exempt or defer real estate taxes for the elderly and perma-
nently and totally disabled, provided that the taxpayer meets cer-
tain criteria.473 One criteria involved is a calculation of the income
and financial worth of the taxpayer involved, and the taxpayer
may exempt certain property from the financial worth calcula-
tions.474 The General Assembly amended this legislation to pro-
vide that local governments in the Eighth Planning District
475
may allow elderly or permanently disabled taxpayers to exclude
the taxpayer's dwelling and twenty-five acres of non-income pro-
470. Id. (stating that such transactions are exempt from the requirements of Virginia
Code section 2.2-1156 (Cum. Supp. 2002)).
471. Id. § 58.1-3233 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
472. Id. § 58.1-3233(2) (new language in italics). Prior to this amendment, the mini-
mum acreage for those designated areas was two acres. See id. § 58.1-3233(2) (Repl. Vol.
2000).
473. See id. § 58.1-3211(1)(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
474. Id. § 58.1-3211(3)-(4).
475. The Eighth Planning District, which is primarily Northern Virginia, includes "(i)
any county having a population of more than 800,000, as determined by the 1990 United
States Census; (ii) any county or city adjacent thereto; (iii) any city contiguous to such ad-
jacent counties and cities; and (iv) any incorporated town located in the counties described
in clauses i) and (ii) . . . ." Id. § 58.1-3211(4).
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ducing land from the financial worth calculations. 6 Under prior
law, taxpayers in the Eighth Planning District were only permit-
ted to exclude one acre of land from the calculations.477
The remaining two amendments to the real estate tax provi-
sions involve partial exemptions for rehabilitated properties.478
First, the General Assembly removed the total square footage
limitation for the replacement of commercial and industrial struc-
tures, where the local government has provided a partial exemp-
tion from real estate property tax in an effort to promote such re-
habilitation.4 79 Second, with regard to rehabilitated multi-family
residential structures, the General Assembly deleted the re-
quirement that the total square footage of the replacement struc-
ture may not exceed thirty percent of the replaced multi-family
residential unit; rather, the General Assembly granted local gov-
ernments the authority to set the square footage requirements by
ordinance.480
N. Uniform Statewide Building Code
1. Inspections of Rental Properties
The 2002 General Assembly amended the Uniform Statewide
Building Code481 with regard to the frequency of inspections of
rental properties.482 The amendment provides that a local build-
ing official may perform inspections of specific rental properties
"at specific time intervals ... but not more than once each calen-
dar year upon a separate finding that such additional inspections
are necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare. 483
However, if the building official determines that such inspections
476. Id.
477. Id. § 58.1-3211(4) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
478. Id. § 58.1-3220(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002); id. § 58.1-3231 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
479. Compare id. § 58.1-3231(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002), with id. § 58.1-3231 (Cum. Supp.
2001). The deleted provision stated that "[s]uch replacement structures may exceed the
total square footage of the replaced structures by no more than 110 percent in areas des-
ignated as enterprise zones by the Commonwealth, and by no more than 100 percent in all
other areas." Id. § 58.1-3231(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
480. Compare id. § 58.1-3220(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002), with id. § 58.1-3220(A) (Cum.
Supp. 2001).
481. Id. §§ 36-97 to -119.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
482. See id. § 36-105 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
483. Id.
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are necessary, the building official is precluded from conducting
inspections of the specific property upon the occurrence of a
change in ownership or a termination of a tenancy.4" 4
2. Adoption of the Standards of the International Code Council,
Rehabilitation of Existing Commercial Properties and Fire
Prevention
By enacting House Bill 1211,4"5 the General Assembly made
several significant changes to the Uniform Statewide Building
Code.4" 6 The General Assembly provided that the Board of Hous-
ing and Community Development (the "Housing Board") should
develop the statewide building code while giving "due regard for
generally accepted standards as recommended by nationally rec-
ognized organizations, including.., the International Code
Council and the National Fire Protection Association."48 7
The General Assembly also made a declaration that there is an
urgent need to improve and rehabilitate the existing stock of
commercial properties in the Commonwealth, and that the appli-
cation of the existing building code sometimes has caused reha-
bilitation of such properties to be costly and time-consuming. 488
According to the declaration, the additional cost and time in-
volved with rehabilitation of commercial properties in the Com-
monwealth have resulted "in a significant reduction in the
amount of rehabilitation activity taking place."48 9 In conformance
with that declaration, the General Assembly directed that the
Housing Board enact building regulations "that facilitate the
maintenance, rehabilitation, development and reuse of existing
484. Id.
485. H.B. 1211, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 5, 2002, ch.
555, 2002 Va. Acts 1077) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-99, -99.01, -103, -119.1, -137
and -139 (Cum. Supp. 2002)).
486. See VA. CODE ANN. § 36-98 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (giving the Board of Housing and
Community Development the power to adopt and promulgate a Uniform Statewide Build-
ing Code).
487. See id. § 36-99(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002). The amendment to this section deleted ref-
erences to the Southern Building Code Congress and the Building Officials Conference of
America and replaced them with the International Code Council. See id.
488. Id. § 36-99.01(B) (Cum. Supp.2002).
489. Id.
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buildings at the least possible cost to ensure the protection of the
public health, safety and welfare. 49 °
In furtherance of the declaration to promote rehabilitation and
to promote fire prevention, the General Assembly directed the
Housing Board to appoint a "Building Code Academy Advisory
Committee" ("the Committee") that is to be comprised of code en-
forcement personnel and representatives of the construction in-
dustry.491 The Committee is to advise the Housing Board and the
Director of the Department of Housing and Community Develop-
ment regarding "policies, procedures, operations, and other mat-
ters pertinent to 'enhancing the delivery of training services pro-
vided by the Building Code Academy."492 In addition, the General
Assembly stated that the Building Code Academy must be estab-
lished and operated "for the training of persons in the content,
application, and intent of specified subject areas of the building
and fire prevention regulations promulgated" by the Housing
Board.493
0. Land Use
1. Subdivision Plats, Site Plans, and Other Development Plans
The General Assembly amended the Virginia Code relative to
preliminary subdivision plats to provide that such plats are valid
for a five-year period once approved, subject to satisfying certain
criteria.49 4 To ensure the plat remains valid during the five-year
period, the subdivider must submit "a final subdivision plat for
all or a portion of the property within one year of such approval
or such longer period as may be prescribed by local ordinance,"
and the subdivider must "diligently pursue[ ] approval of the final
subdivision plat."'495 According to the amendment, "[d]iligent pur-
suit of approval means that the subdivider has incurred extensive
obligations or substantial expenses relating to the submitted final
490. Id. § 36-103 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
491. Id. § 36-137(7) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
492. Id.
493. Id. § 36-139(14) (Cum. Supp. 2002) (new language in italics).
494. Id. § 15.2-2260(F) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
495. Id.
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subdivision plat or modifications thereto."496 However, after three
years following approval of the preliminary subdivision plat, the
planning commission or the subdivision agent, as the case may
be, "may revoke such approval upon a specific finding of facts that
the subdivider has not diligently pursued approval of the final
subdivision plat."497 The planning commission or the subdivision
agent, as the case may be, may revoke the plat only after giving
the subdivider ninety days prior written notice sent by certified
mail.4 9
In what appears to be a curative statute, the General Assembly
amended the Virginia Code to validate certain recorded subdivi-
sion plats and site plans even though those plats or plans conflict
with the underlying zoning.499 Specifically, the new provision
states that if the provisions of a recorded subdivision plat or final
site plan conflict with the underlying zoning, but the plat or plan
"was specifically determined by the governing body and not its
designee, to be in accordance with the zoning conditions" ap-
proved under conditional zoning, "the provisions of the recorded
plat or final site plan shall control ... ."00 Further, the notice re-
quirements contained in Virginia Code section 15.2-2204 are
deemed satisfied in this particular set of circumstances. °1
Subdividers often must post a performance bond or other form
of surety to ensure the construction of public facilities that will be
dedicated to a locality, a public agency or the Commonwealth. °2
The construction of those facilities often involves inspections to
ensure that the construction is in conformance with the terms
and conditions of a performance agreement.0 3 The General As-
sembly amended the Virginia Code to limit the scope of those in-
spections to the particular terms of the performance agreement.0 4




499. Id. § 15.2-2261.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
500. Id.
501. Id.
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Any inspection of such public facilities shall be based solely upon
conformance with the terms and conditions of the performance
agreement and the approved design plan and specifications for the
facilities for which the performance guarantee is applicable, and
shall not include the approval of any person other than an employee
of the governing body, its administrative agency, the Virginia De-
partment of Transportation or other political subdivision or a person
who has contracted with the governing body, its administrative
agency, the Virginia Department of Transportation or other political
subdivision.
50 5
During the 2002 session, the General Assembly enacted a few
other minor amendments relative to subdivision plats, site plans
and other development plans. First, if a property lies within an
airport noise overlay zone, any survey recorded after January 1,
2003 and any final subdivision plat or final site plan approved af-
ter January 1, 2003 for that property must contain a statement
giving notice that the "property either partially or wholly lies
within an airport noise overlay zone. 50 6 Second, the term "such
facilities" as used in Virginia Code section 15.2-2241 is defined to
be inclusive of all the public facilities constructed as part of a
subdivision and dedicated to a locality, the Commonwealth, or a
public agency. 507 Third, the General Assembly gave local govern-
ments the authority to enact an ordinance to require applicants
for "land disturbing permit[s], including building permits and
erosion and sediment control permits" to provide evidence that
any delinquent real estate taxes owed to the locality on the prop-
erty subject to the permit have been paid.08 Finally, local gov-
ernments with a population density of at least seventy-five per-
sons per square mile who have adopted a tree replacement
ordinance may enact a tree canopy bank ordinance.0 9 The tree
canopy bank will allow developer's to satisfy their tree canopy re-
quirements by providing off-site plantings or by the replacement
of trees at the direction of the locality.
510
505. Id.
506. Id. § 15.2-2295 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
507. Id. § 15.2-2241(5) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
508. Id. § 15.2-2286(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002). Local governments already had the author-
ity to require such evidence for special exception, special use permit, variance, and rezon-
ing applicants. Id.
509. Id. § 15.2-961(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
510. Id. § 15.2-961(B).
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2. Advertisement of Zoning Amendments
Local governments now have the obligation to notify individual
land owners of public hearings before the planning commission or
the governing body for proposed zoning ordinance text amend-
ments that will decrease the allowed dwelling unit density of
twenty-five or more parcels of land. 1 This notice must be written
and mailed to each individual property owner affected by the pro-
posed zoning text amendment.512 However, the locality is not re-
quired to send individually mailed notices to the owner of lots
that contain less than 11,500 square feet of area." 3
3. Clustering of Single-Family Dwellings
One of the more significant changes in the land use arena
made during the 2002 General Assembly involves the clustering
of single-family dwellings.1 4 Now localities have affirmative au-
thority to enact ordinances for the clustering of single-family
dwellings for the purpose of preserving open space.1 5 In adopting
a cluster housing ordinance, the locality may provide
standards, conditions and criteria for clustering of single-family
dwellings and the preservation of open space developments. In estab-
lishing such standards, conditions and criteria, the governing body
may, in its discretion, include any provisions it determines appropri-
ate to ensure quality development, preservation of open space and
compliance with its comprehensive plan and land use ordinances.
516
Cluster development density calculations must be based upon
the same criteria that the locality would otherwise use under its
land use ordinances.517 In addition, a locality may have different
cluster housing standards for different zoning districts within the
locality.518
511. Id. § 15.2-2204(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. § 15.2-2286(A)(12) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
515. Id.
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If a cluster housing proposal complies with the localities'
"adopted standards, conditions and criteria," the development is
permitted "by right under the local subdivision ordinance" and
must be approved administratively without the requirement of a
public hearing.519 For cluster developments that satisfy the stan-
dards, conditions, and criteria, "no local ordinance shall require
that a special exception, special use, or conditional use permit be
obtained." 20 However, an exemption may be set out in the ordi-
nance that "exempt[s] developments of two acres or less from the
provisions" of the cluster-housing development.521 If the cluster
housing proposal does not comply with the density calculations
contained in the locality's land use ordinances, the locality may
still approve the development under specific procedures:
5 2
To implement and approve such increased density development, the
locality may, at its option, (i) establish and provide in its zoning or
subdivision ordinance standards, conditions, and criteria for such
development, and if the proposed development complies with those
standards, conditions and criteria, it shall be permitted by right and
approved administratively by the locality staff in the same manner
provided in subdivision A 12 a [the cluster housing enabling legisla-
tion], or (ii) approve the increased density development upon ap-
proval of a special exception, special use permit, conditional use
permit or rezoning.
52 3
In enacting the cluster housing legislation, the General Assem-
bly gave localities that had housing ordinances as of January 1,
2002, time to conform the locality's ordinances to the new ena-
bling legislation.5 24 The General Assembly also enacted amend-
ments to provide for cluster housing in subdivision ordinances,52
to clarify when localities may require a special use permit for cer-
tain.residential uses,"' and to state that the statewide building
code shall not supersede the "conditions imposed upon a cluster-




522. Id. § 15.2-2286(A)(12)(b).
523. Id.
524. Id. § 15.2-2286(A)(12)(c).
525. Id. § 15.2-2242(8) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
526. Id. § 15.2-2288.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (stating that a locality may require issuance
of a special exception, special use or conditional use permit for "a cluster or town center as
an optional form of residential development at a density greater than that permitted by
right, or otherwise permitted by local ordinance").
[Vol. 37:271
REAL ESTATE AND LAND USE LAW
opment through standards, conditions, and criteria established by
a locality" pursuant to the enabling legislation discussed above.527
4. Miscellaneous Amendments Affecting Land Use
Under new legislation, the chairman of a board of zoning ap-
peals may select one of the alternate members of the board of zon-
ing appeals to vote in the place of a sitting member who is absent
from a meeting or for a sitting member who abstains from a par-
ticular application.5 2' The General Assembly also amended the
power of the board of zoning appeals with regard to the revoca-
tion of special exceptions.529 The new provision states that a board
of zoning appeals may revoke a special exception only if the spe-
cial exception was granted by the board of zoning appeals.53 ° If
the governing body reserves to itself the authority to grant special
exceptions, it may revoke the special exception only after follow-
ing the same procedures required of a board of zoning appeals in
revoking a special exception.531
The General Assembly amended the Virginia Freedom of In-
formation Act532 to exempt from disclosure "[tihe names, ad-
dresses and telephone numbers of complainants furnished in con-
fidence with respect to an investigation of individual zoning
enforcement complaints made to a local governing body." '33
The General Assembly also authorized the City of Chesapeake
to utilize supervised and trained volunteer zoning inspectors to
monitor external maintenance of property and compliance with
local zoning ordinances relating to motor vehicles and trailers.5 34
Finally, in response to the decision in City of Emporia Board of
Zoning Appeals v. Mangum,535 the General Assembly amended
527. Id. § 36-98 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
528. See id. § 15.2-2308(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
529. Id. § 15.2-2309(7) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id. §§ 2.2-3700 to -3714 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
533. Id. § 2.2-3705(A)(81) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
534. Id. § 15.2-1132 (Cum. Supp. 2002). Prior to this amendment, only the City of Vir-
ginia Beach had this authority. Id. §15.2-1132 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
535. 263 Va. 38, 556 S.E.2d 779 (2002). For a discussion of this case, see supra Part
II.K.2.a.
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the Virginia Code to state that a validly nonconforming manufac-
tured housing unit may be replaced with another comparable
manufactured housing unit, and the replacement unit "shall re-
tain the valid nonconforming status of the prior unit."" 6
IV. CONCLUSION
During the period beginning June 1, 2001 and ending June 1,
2002 the areas of condemnation law and land use law continued
to be fertile ground for legislative changes by the General Assem-
bly and for litigation. These areas will likely continue to see sig-
nificant activity on the legislative and judicial fronts as Virginia
continues to grow and develop. In addition, over the past year,
the Supreme Court of Virginia decided significant cases regarding
the doctrine of equitable subrogation, home warranties, easement
disputes, contract disputes, and nuisance claims.537 The General
Assembly made a number of changes that will affect property law
practitioners, particularly the enactment of the Business Trust
Act and changes related to property owners' associations."'
536. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
537. See supra Part II.
538. See supra Part III.
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